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TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Daniel 0. Conkle*
I have pity for the heathens who sit on
the Supreme Court, pity for their
damned souls and blighted minds.
-Bob Jones III1
He drew a circle that shut me out-
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout.
But Love and I had the wit to win:
We drew a circle that took him in.
-Edwin Markham2
We are in the midst of a flourishing academic-and increasingly
public-debate concerning the proper role of the Supreme Court in im-
posing constitutional limitations on government action. The "original-
ists," advocates of what former Attorney General Edwin Meese III has
called a "jurisprudence of original intention,"'3 contend that the Court
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Professors
Craig M. Bradley, Daniel A. Farber, Richard Fraher, John H. Garvey, Donald Gjerdingen, Ira C.
Lupu, Michael J. Perry, William D. Popkin, Richard B. Saphire, Michael B.W. Sinclair, and Mark
V. Tushnet each were kind enough to read and comment upon earlier versions of this Article. I also
received helpful input from a number of other colleagues during and following my presentation of
this Article to a faculty workshop. I am grateful to all these persons. Finally, I wish to thank Jane
A. Henegar for her research assistance, and Indiana University and its School of Law for the finan-
cial support that they provided for this work.
1 Quotes, 69 A.B.A. J. 1016 (1983).
2 E. MARKHAM, Outwitted, in SHOES OF HAPPINESS AND OTHER POEMS 1 (1915).
3 Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S.
TEX. L. REv. 455, 464 (1986) (text of speech to American Bar Association in Washington, D.C.,
July 9, 1985) (emphasis omitted). The Attorney General's well-publicized 1985 arguments evoked
public responses from Justices Brennan and Stevens. See Brennan, The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. RPv. 433 (1986) (text of speech at Georgetown
University, October 12, 1985); Stevens, The Supreme Court of the United States: Reflections After a
Summer Recess, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 447 (1986) (text of speech to Federal Bar Association in Chi-
cago, October 23, 1985). See also Addresses Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. RPv. 1
(1985); Shenon, Meese and His New Vision of the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at 10, col.
3 (city ed.); Taylor, Administration Trolling for Constitutional Debate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1985, at
12, col. 3 (city ed.). In 1987, moreover, President Reagan made a dramatic, but unsuccessful, at-
tempt to put the Attorney General's theory into practice by nominating Robert H. Bork to the
Supreme Court. The Meese-Brennan-Stevens debate, and especially the Bork nomination, have
transformed what was a largely academic topic into a matter of prominent public and political dis-
cussion. See, eg., Greenhouse, What Went Wrong: Reagan's Popularity Was Not Enough to End
Fears of Shift on Social Issues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at 10, col. I (city ed.); Lewis, The Bork
Surprise, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1987, at 27, col. 5 (city ed.); Lewis, The Larger Message, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1987, at 39, col. 5 (city ed.). Cf Price, Preface, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 1 (1987) ("[TIhe
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must limit itself to an historical inquiry-that it ought not recognize a
constitutional limitation on majoritarian action4 unless the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution intended that limitation. 5 "Nonoriginalists,"
on the other hand, argue that the Court should not be confined to an
historical search for original intentions. Instead, the Court properly may
expound the meaning of evolving constitutional norms for policing the
actions of majorities in our modem society.6
Simultaneous with this general debate about the proper role of the
Supreme Court in the exercise of judicial review, another matter also has
risen to the forefront of academic and public discourse: the role of reli-
gion in American politics 7 and the proper relationship between church
and state.8 This controversy is intimately connected to the debate con-
debate over the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court resulted in the most
extraordinary national seminar on the Constitution and the role of the Court since, perhaps, the
debate over secession.") (preface to special issue devoted to Bork nomination).
4 For purposes of this Article, "majoritarian" action means action taken by legislative or execu-
tive officials. In a representative democracy such as ours, we must assume that such action tends to
reflect the will of a majority of the people. In any event, it tends to be more reflective of that will
than the decisions of the unelected and life-tenured justices of the Supreme Court.
5 This Article is concerned primarily with originalist and competing theories of judicial review
not as they relate to questions of federalism or the proper separation of government powers, but
rather as they relate to constitutional restraints that apply to all levels of American government. See
infra text accompanying note 15. For academic statements of the originalist position concerning
various restraints of this latter type, see, for example, R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981); and Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark- Two Centuries of Evolution of
Constitutional Processes, 55 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1976).
6 See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); Conkle, The Legitimacy ofJudicial
Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 587 (1985); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033 (1981); Welling-
ton, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards. Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
Robert H. Bork recently has stated that the question of whether courts should limit themselves
to an originalist inquiry "has been a topic of fierce debate in the law schools for the past thirty years.
The controversy shows no sign of subsiding. To the contrary, the torrent of words is freshening."
Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823, 823
(1986). Bork believes that judges who decide constitutional cases should pay more heed to general
theories of constitutional interpretation, and he hopes that they are beginning to do so. See id. at
823-24.
7 Norman Dorsen and Charles Sims have suggested that "the activity and influence of religious
groups in the nation's political life [have] reached a level probably unparalleled since prohibition."
Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error ofJudgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 837, 837.
8 These issues were an important source of controversy and debate during the 1984 national
election campaign. See A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 1 (1985). As Profes-
sor Joel M. Gora has noted:
With a president committed to prayer in schools, a vice presidential candidate defending her
position on abortion in the face of her church's opposition, and major national figures like New
York's Gov. Mario Cuomo and John Cardinal O'Connor weighing in with highly publicized
1116
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cerning judicial review, for judicial review has become the primary vehi-
cle for determining and enforcing church-state relations in the United
States. Thus, in a range of decisions over the last forty years, the
Supreme Court has imposed the requirements of the first amendment's
establishment clause9 on state as well as federal action,10 and it has used
the clause to enforce a wavering, but relatively strict, separation of
church and state11 at all levels of American government.
While many scholars have dealt generally with the theoretical un-
derpinnings of judicial review 12 and others have addressed the merits of
the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine,13 too little attention
has been paid to the intrinsic relationship between these inquiries.' 4 Yet
one cannot fully evaluate the merits of the constitutional doctrine pro-
pounded by the Court without considering why, or how, the Court
should be undertaking to decide these issues in the first place. In this
Article, I attempt to fill this void by directly considering the relationship
between the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine and various
theoretical models of judicial review.
In Part I, I sketch the broad outlines of originalism and the compet-
ing nonoriginalist theories of judicial review, including process-oriented
theories, theories that call for the Supreme Court to enforce common
societal values, and theories that would engage the Court in a more open-
public commentary, issues of separation of church and state clearly had moved from the quiet
deliberation of law to the rough-and-tumble of politics.
Gora, The Delicate Matter of Religion, 71 A.B.A. J. 84, 84 (1985). More recently, this debate was
fueled by the 1988 presidential campaigns of religious leaders Jesse Jackson and especially Pat Rob-
ertson. See generally King, Robertson Promises Not to Impose His Religious Views on Americans,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at 10, col. 5; Toner, Hosannas to God and Votesfor Jackson, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 7, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
9 This clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment also includes the free exercise clause, which
precludes Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. See id.
10 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 15-16 (1947).
11 In this Article, I use the phrases "church and state" and "religion and government"
interchangeably.
12 See, eg., supra notes 5-6.
13 A number of recent symposia have been devoted to establishment as well as free exercise
issues. See, eg., Perspectives on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv.
245; Religion and the Law Symposium, 18 CONN. L. REv. 697 (1986); Symposium: The Tension
Between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 47 OHIo ST.
L.J. 289 (1986); Religion and the State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 833 (1986). See also Developments
in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1987).
14 This is not to say that scholars have ignored this relationship altogether. Indeed, at least one
scholar has begun to address some of the same types of basic questions that I confront here, although
our analyses and conclusions have little in common. See M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A
CRrICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247-76 (1988) (arguing that conventional theories
of constitutional interpretation are inadequate in the area of the religion clauses and that the republi-
can political tradition provides important insights). See also Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion,
18 CONN. L. REv. 701 (1986); Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33
LoY. L. REV. 221 (1987).
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ended consideration of political-moral principles and policies. Defining
judicial activism as the frustration of majoritarian decisionmaking, I also
evaluate the extent to which each of these theories endorses an activist
judicial role. Using this criterion, I conclude that originalism is the least
activist theory, but that the process-oriented and common values ver-
sions of nonoriginalist theory can nonetheless be considered relatively
"nonactivist" when compared to the political-moral reasoning models.
Part II describes the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine,
a doctrine that is primarily separationist, but that includes a contradic-
tory subtheme permitting the government to favor religion in certain cir-
cumstances. In Part III, I address the relationship of this doctrine to the
comparatively nonactivist theories of judicial review, including original-
ism and the process-based and common values models of nonoriginalist
review. I conclude that none of these theories can adequately explain the
Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine, and that this doctrine, if
defensible at all, must be justified on a theory of political-moral
reasoning.
Finally, in Part IV, I present and defend a political-moral reasoning
model of the establishment clause, a model that calls for an extremely
activist judicial role. I argue that at least in its broad features, the
Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine, including both its domi-
nant separationist component and its contradictory subtheme, can be ex-
plained and justified as a resolution of church-state issues that makes
America stronger, both politically and morally. More specifically, I con-
tend that the Court's doctrine works to ensure a proper respect for the
religious and irreligious beliefs of individuals, supports our important so-
cietal interest in maintaining a religiously inclusive political community,
and, at the same time, does not disserve the valuable role of religion in
our country. I therefore endorse the Court's performance of this polit-
ical-moral function in the context of the establishment clause, and I at-
tempt to justify the judicial activism that results.
I. THEORETICAL MODELS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
As construed by the Supreme Court, the establishment clause does
not concern questions of federalism or the proper separation of govern-
ment powers. Instead, it imposes constitutional restraints that apply at
all levels of American government.15 As a result, the relevant considera-
tions of constitutional theory are those that apply to the recognition of
such restraints on majoritarian government, restraints that typically co-
incide with the recognition of constitutionally protected individual
rights.
15 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 15-16 (1947).
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A. Originalist Theory
Originalist constitutional theory would limit constitutional re-
straints on government to those restraints that were originally intended
by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution (including its various
amendments). 16 On this view, the Supreme Court properly may check
the majoritarian process, but only when the government action under
attack is prohibited by the Constitution as it was originally intended. 17
Absent evidence that a government practice thus violates the original un-
derstanding of one or more constitutional provisions, the Court should
defer to the majoritarian process and permit the government to proceed
as it sees fit.' 8
B. Nonoriginalist Theories
Nonoriginalist theories would permit the Court to go beyond the
16 Hereinafter, when I refer generally to "the Constitution," I include its amendments.
17 For a more detailed discussion of the nature and limitations of originalist judicial review, see
Conkle, supra note 6, at 591-601.
18 The originalist meaning of a constitutional provision depends in the first instance on its lan-
guage, read in the light of its original context. As a result, originalist judicial review roughly approx-
imates what Professor Reed Dickerson, an expert in the field of statutory interpretation, would call
the courts' "cognitive function" in extracting meaning from a legal text. See Dickerson, Statutes and
Constitutions in an Age of Common Law, 48 U. Prlr. L. REv. 773, 776-82 (1987). Given the per-
ceived need for deference to the majoritarian process, however, originalist constitutional theorists
would be more reluctant than Dickerson to recognize "built-in leeway" for the judiciary, in the
performance of its cognitive function, to fill out the meaning of "general" and "vague" constitutional
provisions. See id. at 780. Instead, at least with respect to constitutional restraints on majoritarian
action, originalists would be inclined to limit the judicial role in interpreting such provisions to a
determination of the more specific ends that the framers and ratifiers originally intended to accom-
plish, as revealed, for example, in the "legislative" history of the constitutional provision in question.
Cf Bork, supra note 5, at 8 ("Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be
preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. The judge
must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new
rights.").
In Dickerson's terms, this position might be explained in terms of a (rebuttable, but unrebutted)
factual assumption that the framers and ratifiers of constitutional provisions respect the principle of
majoritarian self-government and have a corresponding distrust of unconstrained judicial policymak-
ing in contravention of that basic value. Cf. Dickerson, supra. at 778 ("There may... be presump-
tions, peculiar to constitutions, based on tacit assumptions of fact that are relevant to resolving
uncertainties of constitutional meaning.") If so, then many of the general and vague provisions of
the Constitution may properly be subject to narrow judicial interpretation: to the extent that such
provisions are directed to the judiciary at all, they might implicitly require the judiciary to construe
them narrowly, and to give them no more meaning than their original context unequivocally re-
quires. On this view, any "built-in leeway" in construing these power-restraining provisions is not
for the courts in the exercise of judicial review, but is rather for legislative and executive officials as
they determine for themselves-without regard to judicial enforceability-what they regard as the
constitutional limitations on their power. For similar reasons, originalism would be quite reluctant
to recognize any type of open-ended judicial authority on the basis of a "delegation" of constitu-
tional lawmaking power to the judiciary. See generally id. at 794-95 (suggesting that general consti-
tutional language may imply a delegation of lawmaking power to the judiciary).
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original understanding and enforce constitutional limitations on govern-
ment action that the framers and ratifiers did not intend.19 Process-ori-
ented theories defend nonoriginalist review to the extent that it works to
enhance the fairness of the democratic process. Substantive theories, by
contrast, focus more directly on the appropriate content of nonoriginalist
constitutional law and the source or sources from which nonoriginalist
constitutional values properly may be drawn.
1. Process-Oriented Theories.-Process-oriented theories of non-
originalist review analyze the political process and attempt to identify the
types of defects in that process that might require judicial intervention.
To a large extent, these theories build upon the Supreme Court's
Carolene Products footnote, in which the Court announced that height-
ened judicial scrutiny might be appropriate for government action that
"restricts [the] political processes" or that reflects "prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities..., which tends seriously to curtail the op-
eration of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities. ' 20 Whether under the Carolene Products formulation or
otherwise,21 process theories attempt to identify deficiencies in the polit-
ical process that can and should be rectified by judicial action.22 These
theories thus defend nonoriginalist review to the extent that it works to
"correct" a political process gone awry, as, for example, when the inter-
ested parties were not fairly represented in that process.
2. Substantive Theories.-Substantive theories of nonoriginalist ju-
dicial review focus directly on the appropriate content of nonoriginalist
constitutional law. Although these theories do not ignore considerations
of process, they concentrate instead on the proper method of identifying
substantive constitutional values. More precisely, they focus on the
source or sources from which such constitutional values properly may be
drawn.
One group of substantive theories calls for the Supreme Court to
derive its decisional norms from values widely held in American society.
These "common values" theories23 differ in chronological focus. Some
are primarily backward-looking, calling for the Supreme Court to protect
traditional American values against encroachment by modern govern-
19 Nonoriginalist judicial review roughly approximates what Professor Dickerson would call the
courts' "creative function" in adding meaning to a legal text. See Dickerson, supra note 18, at 782-
95.
20 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
21 For a critique of the Carolene Products formulation, see Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Prod-
ucts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
22 See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
23 See generally M. TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 133-43; Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent
Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1537-38 (1985); Sadurski, Conventional Morality and
Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339 (1987).
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ment.24 Others look more to the present and future, enlisting the Court
in the cause of American societal development by permitting it to recog-
nize constitutional rights on the basis of contemporary and emerging na-
tional values.25
Another group of substantive theories would have the Court move
beyond the enforcement of common American values by engaging in a
process of political-moral reasoning and analysis. According to these
"political-moral reasoning" theories, the Court should play an active role
in developing, not merely reflecting, the values that ought to be protected
from majoritarian rule. Some theorists call these values "public val-
ues."'26 Others rely more openly on notions of political and moral
philosophy. 27
C. Levels of Judicial Activism
Judicial activism may be defined as the use of judicial power28 to
override or frustrate the decisions of legislative or executive officials-
decisions reflecting, at least presumptively, the process of (representative)
majoritarian rule.29 Any judicial enforcement of constitutional limita-
tions tends to frustrate majoritarian rule, and therefore any form of judi-
cial review constitutes judicial activism.30 The various models of judicial
review, however, do permit differing levels of judicial activism, varying
with the nature of the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process and the
scope of permissible judicial decisions. The level of judicial activism var-
ies quantitatively with the number of judicial invalidations that result
24 See, ag., Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 981,
1039-50 (1979).
25 See, eg., Conkle, supra note 6, at 626-37.
26 See, eg., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1979). See generally M. TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 160-68; Tushnet, supra note 23, at
1539-44.
27 Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, has argued for "a fusion of constitutional law and
moral theory." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977). See generally E. CHEMER-
iNSKY, supra note 6, at 129-41 (advocating "open-ended modernism" as a method of constitutional
interpretation).
28 This Article is concerned primarily with the power of the Supreme Court.
29 This definition does not embrace all of what might be called "judicial activism." It does not
consider, for example, the propensity of judges to overrule established precedent. For recent discus-
sions of the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication, see, for example, Frickey, Stare Decisis
in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 123
(1985); Hazard, Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 153, 162-67 (1986); Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467; Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988); and Monaghan, Tak-
ing Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1 (1979). See generally Schaner, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). For a discussion of the various possible meanings ofjudicial activism
and restraint, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 198-222 (1985).
30 Cf. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that "any ruling overturning decisions by
popularly elected officials is, by definition, undemocratic").
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from judicial review in accordance with a particular model. It varies
qualitatively with the extent to which the Court's method of decision
dishonors majoritarian values.
In quantitative terms, originalism plainly describes the least activist
form of judicial review. The Supreme Court is authorized to recognize
and protect only a closed set of constitutional values, those values placed
in the Constitution at the time of its adoption.31 Moreover, most of these
values command a nearly universal consensus in our modem society, and
majoritarian institutions are therefore likely to honor them. As a result,
the occasions on which originalist judicial review leads to the invalida-
tion of majoritarian action are exceedingly few in number.32
Although nonoriginalist judicial review, in general, is quantitatively
more activist than originalist review, it is more difficult to quantify the
comparative activism of the differing models of nonoriginalist review.
One might suspect, however, that the process-oriented theories and the
common values theories would be less likely to permit judicial invalida-
tions than the political-moral reasoning models. Process theories permit
judicial activism only when there is a defect in the political process that
is amenable to judicial correction, a circumstance that presumably is the
exception, not the rule. Common values substantive theories call for the
judicial invalidation of majoritarian decisions that deviate from widely
shared values. Yet because majoritarian decisions normally reflect
widely shared values, this type of judicial activism also is likely to oper-
ate with relative infrequency. By contrast, political-moral reasoning
models of nonoriginalist review do not limit the occasions for judicial
invalidation to the correction of defects in the political process or to the
enforcement of common values. As a result, political-moral reasoning
models permit the broadest possible range of judicial activism, and there-
fore are likely to result in the largest number of judicial invalidations.
Judicial activism, and the competing theoretical models of judicial
review, also may be analyzed in qualitative terms. Although all judicial
review is countermajoritarian, some methods of review do less violence
than others to America's basic commitment to majoritarian policymak-
ing. At this level of analysis, the focus must be on the nature of
the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process and its relationship to
majoritarian values.
31 See Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 9, 14-15 (1985).
32 See, eg., M. PERRY, supra note 6, at 19; Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 234 (1980). In certain areas, the Supreme Court apparently has
refused to enforce even the originalist meaning of constitutional limitations on government action.
See, eg., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding legislation that the
framers and ratifiers of the contract clause apparently intended to prohibit). For discussions of the
implications of such a refusal, see Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
Cm. L. REv. 703, 735-38 (1984), and Sandalow, supra note 6, at 1060-68.
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The originalist model of judicial review permits the Court to protect
certain values from majoritarian transgression, but they must be values
originally placed in the Constitution by virtue of (super-) majoritarian
government processes.3 3 Nonoriginalist models cannot claim the same
pedigree. 34 Even in the nonoriginalist domain, however, certain models
of judicial review can be said to promote majoritarian values even as the
Court acts to invalidate majoritarian actions. According to the process
models, for example, judicial review can operate to correct defects in the
majoritarian process, thereby arguably permitting that process to operate
more effectively than it otherwise would.35 Likewise, the common values
substantive models call for the Court to enforce widely held societal val-
ues, values that-in some sense at least-are majoritarian in nature.3 6
The most activist models of judicial review under this qualitative
analysis are, again, the political-moral reasoning models of nonoriginalist
review. These models cannot claim support from the majoritarian ac-
tions that resulted in the adoption of the Constitution. They do not pur-
port merely to correct defects in the majoritarian process, nor do they tie
the Court to values that are widely held among the American people.
Rather, they engage the Court in a process of political-moral decision-
making that lacks any direct connection either to the majoritarian pro-
cess or to majoritarian values.
Based on both quantitative and qualitative considerations, then, it is
possible to arrange the competing theoretical models on a continuum of
judicial activism. Although there could be differing views on the place-
ment of particular theories, the general thrust of the continuum seems
clear. The originalist model represents the least activist form of judicial
review. The most activist models, on the other hand, are the political-
moral reasoning models of nonoriginalist review. Somewhere in between
lie the process-oriented and the common values nonoriginalist theories.
33 Cf. Bork, supra note 5, at 3 ("Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined
areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majori-
ties by, the Constitution."); Lupu, supra note 24, at 1042 ("The entire body of the Constitution,
amendments and all, is a series of judgments by an extraordinary majority that limit the power of
future political majorities.").
34 Cf Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
695, 697 (noting that there is no persuasive evidence that the framers and ratifiers intended the
judiciary to develop constitutional limitations on majoritarian government that the framers and ra-
tifiers did not themselves provide).
35 Professor John Hart Ely, for example, claims that his process theory "is not inconsistent with,
but on the contrary is entirely supportive of, the American system of representative democracy." J.
ELY, supra note 22, at 102.
36 If a common values theory calls for the Court to use national societal values as its source of
decision, it is advocating a source of decision "that is 'majoritarian' in the sense that it derives from
American values, albeit values that may conflict with the will of temporary or local majorities."
Conkle, supra note 6, at 658 (emphasis in original).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The first words in the Bill of Rights are those of the establishment
clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion... ." 37 Despite its place of special prominence in the Constitution,
however, the establishment clause drew little note in the Supreme Court
for more than 150 years. The clause emerged from obscurity only in
194738 in the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education.39
In Everson, a taxpayer challenged a state statute and local school
board resolution permitting reimbursement for bus fares incurred by
parents in transporting their children to Roman Catholic schools.40
Although the Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenge on a
five-four vote, all nine Justices agreed on two critical determinations con-
cerning the scope and application of the establishment clause. First, they
determined that the establishment clause, applicable by its terms only to
federal government action,41 would be applied to the states as well, based
on a finding that the fourteenth amendment-which applies to state ac-
tion-"incorporated" the provisions of the establishment clause.42 Sec-
ond, the Justices read the establishment clause, as applied to both state
and federal action, to state a principle requiring the separation of religion
and government, a principle that prohibited public aid and support for
religion.43
Speaking for the majority in Everson, Justice Black elaborated the
prohibitions that he found in the establishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
37 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment also provides that Congress shall not prohibit
the "free exercise" of religion. Id
38 The Court did discuss the establishment clause in a few cases prior to 1947. See, eg., Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
39 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
40 Reimbursement was available for transportation to public schools as well. See id at 3, 17.
41 See Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
42 This "finding" of incorporation was little more than a bare assertion, for neither the majority
nor the dissent engaged in any significant analysis of this issue. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8, 14-15
(majority opinion); id at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
The Court had previously applied the free exercise clause to the states in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Although the question of whether the establishment clause also should be
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment was not at issue in Cantwell, the Court spoke in broad
language that appeared to endorse the finding of incorporation that it later made in Everson. See id
at 303.04.
43 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (majority opinion); id at 31-33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against, establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."44
The dissenters agreed, arguably stating the matter even more forcefully:
"[T]he object was broader than separating church and state in [a] narrow
sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively for-
bidding every form of public aid or support for religion. '45
Everson thus established the Supreme Court's basic approach to the
establishment clause. The clause would be applied to state as well as
federal action. It would be construed to prohibit not only the establish-
ment of official churches, but also lesser forms of aid and support for
particular religions to the exclusion of others. Finally, it would operate
even more broadly to prevent government from furthering the general
cause of religion, even when the government action suggested no prefer-
ence for any particular religion or religious group.
The separationist4" doctrine enunciated in Everson evolved over
time into a three-pronged test for evaluating whether a statute (or other
government action) can be upheld in the face of an establishment clause
challenge.47 As stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman 48: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion... ; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.' 49 A failure to satisfy any one of these prongs is sufficient to
require the statute's invalidation.
Using the Everson doctrine and the Lemon test, the Supreme Court
has invalidated numerous government practices, many of them relating
to public and private education. The Court has prohibited spoken group
44 Id at 15-16.
45 Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
46 For convenience, I use the term "separationist" to suggest not only a policy of keeping reli-
gion and government separate, but also, and perhaps even more fundamentally, a policy of strict
government neutrality toward religion. For recent discussions of terminology and proposed typolo-
gies of church-state arguments, see Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary
American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. RFv. 371, and McConnell, You Can't Tell the Players in Church-
State Disputes Without a Scorecard, 10 HAnv. J.L. & PUB. POI'y 27 (1987).
47 The first two prongs of the test derive from School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
48 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
49 Cf Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-55 (1982) (calling for test of "strict scrutiny" when
challenged government action prefers certain religions over others).
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prayer and Bible reading in the public schools,50 it has invalidated a stat-
ute authorizing a moment of silent prayer at the opening of the school
day,5I and it has refused to permit the states to mandate the teaching of
"creation-science" theory alongside the theory of evolution.52 At the
same time, the Court has made it extremely difficult for states to provide
financial aid to parochial schools, striking down numerous legislative ef-
forts to support these educational programs.53
Three recent cases illustrate the force and vitality of the three-
pronged Lemon test. In Wallace v. Jaffree,54 the moment-of-silence case,
the Supreme Court focused on the first prong of the test, which requires
that a statute have a secular legislative purpose. At issue was an Ala-
bama statute permitting public school teachers to announce a minute of
silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer."' 55 Reaffirming the Everson
principle that government may not prefer religion over irreligion,56 the
Supreme Court concluded that the "actual purpose" of the Alabama leg-
islature was a constitutionally impermissible "endorsement" of reli-
gion.57 Because it lacked a secular purpose, the statute was invalid under
the first prong of Lemon, and no further analysis was required.5 8
The Court used the second and third prongs of the Lemon test in
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball5 9 and Aguilar v. Felton. 60 In these
cases, the Court invalidated government programs under which publicly
50 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
51 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
52 Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
53 See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
54 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
55 ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
56 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52-53 & n.37.
57 Id at 56. The Court cited statements by the sponsor of the legislation that he intended to
'return voluntary prayer' to the public schools." It also noted that the legislation was passed to
supplement an existing statute that had already provided for a moment of silence "for meditation"-
but not explicitly "for prayer"-and that the Alabama legislature, through yet another enactment,
had attempted to authorize spoken group prayer in the public schools. Id at 56-60.
58 Id at 56 ("[No consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not
have a clearly secular purpose.").
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Jaffree expressed the view of five justices. Justice Powell,
although he joined the majority opinion, also wrote a separate concurrence indicating that he would
have upheld the statute if, in addition to its religious purpose, "it also had a clear secular purpose."
Id at 66 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, concurring only in the judgment, suggested
that she would approve a "moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to
permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one alter-
native over the others." Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist wrote dissenting opinions.
The Supreme Court's "creation-science" decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573
(1987), also was grounded on the first prong of Lemon. See Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2578-83.
59 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
60 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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funded teachers taught secular subjects in religious schools. The Court
found that the challenged programs had the purpose of supporting secu-
lar education, thereby satisfying the first prong of Lemon.6 The Court
concluded, however, that the programs could not survive the remainder
of the Lemon analysis.
The Supreme Court found that the Grand Rapids programs violated
the Lemon test's second prong by having the primary or principal effect
of promoting religion.62 The Court reasoned that the publicly funded
teachers might knowingly or unwittingly "conform their instruction to
the environment in which they teach," thereby furthering the religious
mission of the private schools. 63 The program challenged in Aguilar, on
the other hand, was designed to avoid this vice. It included a system of
government monitoring to ensure that the classes taught by the publicly
funded teachers would remain entirely secular.64 That very system of
monitoring, however, led the Court to find an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion in violation of the Lemon test's third prong.65
The Supreme Court's recent opinions in Jaffree, Grand Rapids, and
Aguilar indicate the Court's basic commitment to a forceful interpreta-
tion of the establishment clause, an interpretation that the Court first
embraced in Everson and that has generally prevailed since that time.
This is not to suggest that this interpretation of the establishment
clause-including the Lemon test through which it typically is imple-
mented-is one of easy application. To the contrary, the Court has had
great difficulty applying the Everson doctrine and the Lemon test, espe-
cially in cases involving aid to parochial schools. 66 Differences of opin-
61 The Court made this finding explicit in Grand Rapids. See 473 U.S. at 383. A similar finding
doubtless was appropriate in Aguilar. See 473 U.S. at 408-09 (describing programs challenged in
Aguilar as similar to those at issue in Grand Rapids). Indeed, the finding of a secular purpose has
become routine in the Supreme Court's parochial aid cases, forcing the analysis into the second and
third prongs of the Lemon test. Cf Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 383 ("As has often been true in
school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test.").
62 Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 384-97.
63 See id at 388. The Court also suggested that the children attending the schools, as well as the
public at large, might perceive a "symbolic union of church and state" suggesting a government
endorsement of religion, id, at 390, and that the programs impermissibly advanced the "sectarian
enterprise" of the schools because the effect of the aid was "direct and substantial." Id. at 392-97.
64 See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409. The Court left open the question of whether the monitoring
system was successful in avoiding a violation of the "effect" prong of Lemon. IL
65 See id. at 409-14. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion lamented the "Catch-22" that he
believed the Court had created. Ia at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. Bowen v. Kendrick,
108 S. Ct. 2562, 2577-78 (1988) (rejecting "'Catch-22' argument" in finding that monitoring of
grants under Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981 would not necessarily lead to impermissible entan-
glement problems).
66 See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 680-81 (1980); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 18-19 (1978-79); Ro-
tunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and
State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C.L. Rnv. 917, 929-34 (1987). Professor John Gar-
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ion on questions of application, moreover, might well reflect differing
commitments to the basic philosophy of separation that the Court es-
poused in Everson.67 Nonetheless, that philosophy stands as the central
theme in the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence.
Beneath the central theme of separation, however, lurks an impor-
tant subtheme, evidenced by certain decisions that simply cannot be rec-
onciled with the Lemon test and the Everson philosophy from which it
arose. In Marsh v. Chambers,6 for example, the Supreme Court ap-
proved the practice of prayer in state legislatures by publicly paid chap-
lains. Likewise, in Lynch v. Donnelly,69 it upheld the use of a Christian
nativity scene in a municipal Christmas display. In Marsh, the Court
completely ignored the Lemon test; in Lynch, it purported to apply the
test after describing it as one of several possible lines of analysis. 70 In
each case, however, the challenged practice obviously advanced the cause
of religion, both in purpose and primary effect, thereby requiring invali-
dation under any meaningful application of Lemon's requirements. 71
The Court's decisions upholding these practices therefore reflect an im-
portant deviation from the Lemon test-and from the Everson philoso-
phy of separation that the Lemon test is designed to further.72
The primary thrust of the Supreme Court's establishment clause
doctrine, then, is to require a careful separation of religion and govern-
vey has developed an analytical framework that might permit a more coherent and consistent treat-
ment of parochial school aid cases. See Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, 1985 Sup.
Cr. REv. 61. For a more general proposed reformulation of Lemon, see Simson, The Establishment
Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905 (1987).
67 In each of the three recent cases discussed in the text, for example, the justices were deeply
divided. See also, eg., Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (5-4 decision rejecting "facial"
challenge to Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981).
68 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
69 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
70 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
71 In Marsh, the Supreme Court made no claim that the challenged practice of legislative prayer
could survive the first two prongs of Lemon, but rather ignored the Lemon test entirely. In Lynch,
on the other hand, the Court stated that the city's display of the nativity scene had secular pur-
poses-"to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday," Lynch, 465 U.S. at
681-and that the city had not violated the "primary effect" test because the benefits to religion were
insubstantial, see id. at 681-83. But if Christmas has come to include both secular and religious
components, the display of a nativity scene can serve no purpose except to promote the religious
character of the holiday. For the same reason, the primary effect of such a display is to promote
religion, regardless of whether that primary effect is substantial or modest. See generally Braveman,
The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REv. 352, 363-78 (1986)
(criticizing Lynch as an "abandonment" of the principle of government neutrality with respect to
religion); Dorsen & Sims, supra note 7, at 855 (arguing that Court improperly ignored "the particu-
lar mischief-favoritism to a particular religion, Christianity-of which plaintiffs were com-
plaining") (emphasis in original).
72 These recent cases are not the only examples of this deviation. Earlier examples might include
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding public school "released time" for religious in-
struction); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws); and Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for religious organizations).
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ment. This separation was first endorsed in Everson and has been imple-
mented through the Lemon test. At the same time, however, the Court
has permitted government to favor religion in selected circumstances,
creating a contradictory subtheme in its doctrine.
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE LESS ACTIVIST
MODELS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Taking the value of majoritarian rule as a given, 73 and accepting my
earlier definition of judicial activism as the use of judicial power to frus-
trate that value,74 judicial activism stands as "a deviant institution in the
American democracy." 75 This deviance, however, is not uniform for all
types of judicial review. Originalist review is less activist than non-
originalist review, and the process-oriented and common values ap-
proaches to nonoriginalist review are less activist than the political-moral
reasoning models.76
Attempts to defend judicial review, in essence, are attempts to jus-
tify the deviation from majoritarian rule that they entail. The greater the
deviation, the more difficult the defense. Before attempting to defend a
political-moral reasoning approach to the establishment clause, there-
fore, it is appropriate to consider whether less activist theories of judicial
review could justify the same doctrinal result. More specifically, it is ap-
propriate to consider whether originalism or the less activist models of
nonoriginalist review are sufficient to justify the Supreme Court's estab-
lishment clause doctrine.
A. Originalism
The theoretical legitimacy of originalist judicial review has recently
come under serious attack.77 Whatever its ultimate appeal, however,
73 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky contends that constitutional scholars have given too much
weight to this value. See E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 3-11. See also M. PERRY, MORALITY,
PoLrrIcs, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 160-69 (1988) (arguing that the American political
tradition includes an aspiration to justice as well as an aspiration to electorally accountable govern-
ment); Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IowA L. REv. 401
(1986) (arguing that a philosophy of "democratic collectivism" is inconsistent with the text and the
original understanding of the Constitution). A defense of majoritarian rule and an evaluation of its
importance relative to other values lie beyond the scope of this Article. But it seems reasonable to
assume that majoritarian rule is at least important enough to justify a general presumption in favor
of majoritarian decisionmaking. Under such a presumption, those who advocate deviations from
majoritarian rule must shoulder the burden of justifying those deviations in functional terms or
otherwise. See generally E. SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE (1984).
74 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
75 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 18 (1962).
76 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
77 See, eg., Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 636-45 (1985); Simon, The Authority of the
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originalism at least reflects popular conceptions of the decisionmaking
role of judges, and it also represents the least activist form of judicial
review. As compared to other models of judicial decisionmaking,
originalism does less violence to the principle of majoritarian rule and-
on that criterion-is comparatively less controversial. 78
1. The First Amendment.-Is the Supreme Court's establishment
clause doctrine a product of originalist judicial review? The Court seems
to think so, for it has grounded its doctrine squarely on the shoulders of
the framers. 79 In Everson, for example, the Court cited the views of
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.80 Shortly before the adoption of
the Constitution, Madison and Jefferson had spearheaded the drive for
disestablishment in Virginia, a drive that had culminated in the enact-
ment of the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty." 81 According to the
Court in Everson, the people of Virginia had "reached the conviction that
individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist
any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious indi-
vidual or group."82 And "the provisions of the First Amendment, in the
drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such lead-
ing roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same
protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Vir-
ginia statute. '83
Unwilling to accept the received wisdom of Everson, Justice Rehn-
quist recently issued a forceful challenge to the Court's historical conclu-
sions. In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree,8 4 Rehnquist noted
that Jefferson was not even present in the United States when the Bill of
Rights was proposed and ratified, and therefore hardly could have played
a "leading role" in the passage of the first amendment. 85 As for
Madison, Rehnquist conceded that he "was undoubtedly the most im-
Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482
(1985). Professor Richard S. Kay recently has discussed several common objections to originalism
and has offered responses to each. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adju-
dication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 226 (1988).
78 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
79 Cf Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("No provision
of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the religious
clause of the First Amendment."). In other areas of its jurisprudence, the Court has been more
willing to rely on nonoriginalist considerations. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 639-48.
80 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 11.
83 Id. at 13. Although they wrote at greater length, the dissenters in Everson followed essentially
the same historical analysis as the majority, and they reached a similar conclusion concerning the
intended meaning of the establishment clause. See id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
84 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
85 See id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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portant architect among the Members of the House of the Amendments
which became the Bill of Rights, but it was James Madison speaking as
an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of in-
corporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United
States Constitution. ' 86 Instead, Madison intended the establishment
clause "to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps
to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring
neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion. '87
According to Justice Rehnquist, it was widely believed at the time of the
first amendment's adoption that it was proper for government to further
and support the cause of religion; thus, the First Congress would not
have approved a general separation of religion and government, such as
that reflected in Everson and in the Lemon test.88
In evaluating this historical debate, one must begin by recalling the
majoritarian foundation of originalist judicial review. In the exercise of
such review, the Court is protecting values that may conflict with con-
temporary government policies, but they are values that were once
endorsed by a majoritarian process-the process of constitutional enact-
ment.89 As a result, appeals to the original understanding must be ap-
peals to the collective intentions of the framers and ratifiers, that is, the
collective intentions of the officials who voted to propose the enactment
as well as those who voted to ratify it.9° Thus, the norms originally em-
bodied in the establishment clause are the norms that the framers and
ratiflers collectively-and not merely Madison or any other individual-
intended the clause to embrace. Conversely, if the inclusion of any norm
would have caused the provision to fail in Congress or in the ratification
process, that norm cannot be said to fall within the original understand-
ing of the clause.91
Properly conceived, the issue that separates Justice Rehnquist from
Everson's historical analysis concerns the collective intentions of the
framers and ratifiers. According to Rehnquist, they intended merely to
prohibit certain forms of government aid for particular religions to the
exclusion of others. The Everson Court, by contrast, found a broader
86 Id. at 97-98.
87 Id. at 98.
88 See id. at 99-114.
89 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
90 There is evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the original Constitution themselves might
have attached special importance to the "intentions" of the ratifying states, viewed as political enti-
ties. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985). See
also Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77 (1988).
91 Cf Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal ofOriginalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 802 ("The relevant
intention must be the narrowest of any necessary members of the coalition that approves the lan-
guage."). See generally Kay, supra note 77, at 245-51. As Justice Rehnquist suggested in his dissent-
ing opinion in Jaffree, it is relevant to consider the role of legislative compromise in undertaking this
analysis. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92-101 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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intention to prevent government from furthering religion generally, even
in the absence of discrimination among religions.
Needless to say, it can be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the original understanding of a provision in the Bill of Rights.
The evidentiary materials are woefully incomplete,92 and it is difficult to
determine the relevance and relative weight of the various types of evi-
dence that do exist. 93 The historical question addressed in the Everson-
Rehnquist debate is one that falls prey to these evidentiary and analytical
problems; as a result, it is difficult to say whether the framers and ra-
tifiers of the establishment clause intended to adopt a broad or a more
narrow prohibition on congressional action.94 In this instance, however,
the framers' and ratifiers' lack of clarity is quite understandable, for the
issue that separates Rehnquist from the Everson Court was of only secon-
dary importance to those who supported the establishment clause. In-
deed, to focus on this issue is to ignore the motivating reason for the
clause and thereby to misapprehend its original meaning.
At the time of the first amendment's adoption, the newly created
American states reflected divergent views concerning the appropriate re-
lationship between religion and government. Virginia had recently ex-
pressed a separationist philosophy in its Bill for Religious Liberty,95 and
six other states96 also embraced anti-establishment policies. The remain-
ing six states, 97 however, continued to maintain or authorize established
religions.98 In these latter states, at least, the prevailing political philoso-
92 See L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT app.
at 187-89 (1986).
93 See Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 772-
78 (1983). A number of scholars have suggested that the difficulties inherent in the required histori-
cal inquiry render originalism an impracticable constitutional theory. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, supra
note 14, at 32-45; Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 647, 648-55 (1985); Brest, supra note 32, at 221-22; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-500 (1981). Other scholars, to the contrary, have defended the practicabil-
ity of originalist interpretation. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 73, at 122-31; Perry, The Authority
of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551,
app. at 597-602 (1985). Kay, supra note 77, at 236-59; Monaghan, supra note 5, at 377. See gener-
ally Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (emphasizing the need for judgment
and choice in originalist interpretation).
94 For scholarly commentary supporting the conclusion reached by the Court in Everson, see, for
example, L. LEVY, supra note 92, and Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). For scholarly commentary supporting
the conclusion reached by Justice Rehnquist in Jaffree, see, for example, C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY
& E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1964); G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORI-
CAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); and M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE IN-
TENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978).
95 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
96 Delaware, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
97 Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina.
98 A fourteenth state, Vermont, was admitted to the union after the first amendment had been
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phy thus permitted the use of public power for the support and further-
ance of religion.
Given this widespread and deep division, how could Congress and
the ratifying state legislatures 99 have reached agreement on the establish-
ment clause? It was supported, after all, both by separationists and by
those who were committed to programs of state-sponsored religion.
These various political actors simply could not have agreed on a general
principle governing the relationship of religion and government, whether
it be the principle endorsed in Everson or any other. If the establishment
clause had embraced such a principle, it would not have been enacted.
What united the representatives of all the states, both in Congress and in
the ratifying legislatures, was a much more narrow purpose: to make it
plain that Congress was not to legislate on the subject of religion,100
thereby leaving the matter of church-state relations to the individual
states. °10 This purpose honored the anti-establishment policies of states
such as Virginia, but it also protected the existing state establishments
from congressional interference. 10 2 The appropriate breadth-or at least
passed by Congress, but before it had been ratified by the states. Vermont also maintained a system
of established religion, meaning that seven of the fourteen states in existence at the time of ratifica-
tion endorsed such policies.
Professor Leonard W. Levy has carefully detailed the establishment policies that prevailed in
the original thirteen states, as well as Vermont, at the time of the first amendment's adoption, and I
have based my summary on his work. See L. LEVY, supra note 92, at 25-62. According to Professor
Levy, all of the states that maintained or authorized established religions at this time in fact en-
dorsed policies of "multiple establishment," pursuant to which more than one denomination could
receive government sponsorship and support. See id.
99 Among the required three-fourths of the states that ratified the first amendment were Mary-
land, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Vermont, each of which maintained or authorized estab-
lished religions. The other three establishment states, Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts,
delayed their ratification of the Bill of Rights until the twentieth century. Their original failure to
ratify, however, apparently was premised not on a disagreement with the proposed limitations on
national power, but rather on a belief that the proposed limitations were superfluous, the national
government being already confined to the exercise of its enumerated powers. See L. LEVY, supra
note 92, at 85-86.
100 Cf Kurland, supra note 66, at 13 ("The primary purpose of the amendment was to keep the
national government out of religious matters."). See generally Kurland, The Origins of the Religion
Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839, 843-44 (1986).
101 As a result, the establishment clause could be supported even by those who endorsed a policy
of state support for religion, a view most prominently associated with the New England states:
[A]t least in New England, a view of government prevailed which not merely permitted but
required a state's public power to be exercised for the advancement of religion. Nothing in the
materials with which I am familiar would indicate, however, that any New England statesman
or churchman saw that power as one appropriate to the federal government. Parochial consid-
erations with respect to how national authority, if it should exist, might be brought to bear upon
the churches of New England reinforced the logic of federalism to convince the Yankee that
Congress should make no laws respecting an establishment of religion.
M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 26 (1965).
102 See W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONS 8-10 (1964); Snee, Religious Dises-
tablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371 (1954).
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the appropriate phrasing-of the establishment clause was a matter that
received considerable attention in the First Congress, but primarily as an
issue concerning the appropriate means for effecting a policy of federal-
ism on questions of church and state. 10 3
When the original Constitution was proposed and ratified, it was
widely understood that, even without the first amendment, the newly cre-
ated national government would have no power on the subject of reli-
gion. James Madison himself, for example, believed that there was "not
a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with reli-
gion" and that the "least interference with it would be a most flagrant
usurpation." 10 4 The national government was conceived as a govern-
ment of limited and enumerated powers, and these powers did not extend
to matters of religion.10 5
The Bill of Rights was designed, in the words of Madison, "to extin-
guish from the bosom of every member of the community" any fear that
the national government would exceed its stated powers and thereby en-
croach upon the rights of individuals and of the states. 10 6 On many of
the subjects addressed-freedom of expression and the rights of the crim-
inally accused, for example-the framers and ratifiers may have formu-
lated and agreed upon general principles concerning the role of
government and the rights of individuals, principles as suitable for appli-
cation to the states as to the federal government. 10 7 Because there was
no fear of encroachment by state government, there was no need to make
the Bill of Rights enforceable against the states.108 But many of its prin-
ciples would have been widely endorsed by the framers and ratifiers as
principles to which each state should adhere.
The establishment clause, by contrast, could not have reflected such
103 See L. LEVY, supra note 92, at 75-84; Snee, supra note 102, at 379-89. See also T. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 213 (1986) (characterizing the debate in the First Congress as "a discussion about
style, not substance"). But see Laycock, supra note 94, at 908 (arguing that "when the Framers
debated the details of the religion clauses, their views on religious liberty were more salient than
their views on federalism").
104 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (J. Elliot 2d Ed. 1836).
105 See L. LEVY, supra note 92, at 65-66. The early national government did exercise power over
certain matters of religion when it was governing in the absence of competing state authority, as, for
example, in the western territories. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 94, at 95-104.
106 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 431-32 (1789) (remarks of Rep. Madison).
107 See generally L. LEVY, The Bill of Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 105 (1986); L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985). But cf Van Alstyne,
Congressional Power and Free Speech: Levy's Legacy Revisited (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1095-99 (1986) (arguing that federalism was the principal issue for the framers of the first
amendment even with respect to freedom of expression, and that the amendment was intended to
remove from Congress and reserve to the states a broad range of power concerning the regulation of
speech and press).
108 See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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a general principle, for the framers and ratifiers could not have agreed on
its content. Instead, perhaps more than any other provision in the first
eight amendments, it was designed to restrain the national government
because it was the national government, not because the national govern-
ment might violate principles that needed no further protection in the
states. As a statement of general principle, the establishment clause
would not have been enacted. As a statement of federalism, it was widely
supported. 10 9
The establishment clause, as originally understood, thus was
animated by the policy of federalism. This conclusion does not resolve
the Everson-Rehnquist debate, but it may help explain the historical ar-
guments that have been advanced. The issue for the framers and ratifiers
was, in essence, how to effectuate the basic policy of federalism on which
they all agreed. If they intended the more narrow prohibition suggested
by Justice Rehnquist in Jaffree, they did so because they were satisfied
that such a prohibition would resolve their federalism concerns. If, on
the other hand, they intended the broader prohibition identified by the
Court in Everson, it was because they embraced an even stronger policy
of federalism, one that would remove from Congress and preserve to the
states an even broader segment of legislative power.
As applied to congressional legislation, the original understanding
of the establishment clause depends on a resolution of the Everson-Rehn-
quist debate. Although Justice Rehnquist's arguments are not without
merit, the Everson Court's position is at least equally forceful. 110 The
resolution of this debate, however, is of limited importance, because the
Court's establishment clause cases typically address state, not federal,
government policies. Even assuming that Everson correctly identified the
original understanding of the establishment clause as applied to federal
action, the historical premise for applying this prohibition to the states
remains to be examined.
109 Professor William Van Alstyne has noted that federalism was only one of three basic princi-
ples that supported the adoption of the establishment clause (and the religion clauses generally), the
other two being religious voluntarism and separatism. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme
Court" Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770,
772-78. As to the motivations of a number of framers and ratifiers, Van Alstyne's point is well-
taken. But the principles of voluntarism and separatism, as general principles concerning the proper
relationship of religion and government, certainly were not supported by those from states maintain-
ing established religions. As a result, those principles cannot properly be found in the original un-
derstanding of the establishment clause, for the clause would not have been enacted had it been
understood to include them.
110 A study by Professor Leonard W. Levy strongly supports the Everson Court's reading of the
historical record. See L. LEVY, supra note 92. This study expands upon earlier work in which Levy
presented similar arguments. See L. LEvY, No Establishment of Religion: The Original Understand-
ing, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 169 (1972). For an argu-
ment that Levy's conclusion is sound but his reasoning faulty, see Laycock, supra note 94, at 906-13.
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2. The Fourteenth Amendment.-In his dissenting opinion in Jaf-
free, Justice Rehnquist took the Everson Court to task for its reading of
the history of the first amendment. At the same time, however, he ac-
cepted without challenge the Everson Court's "'incorporation' of the Es-
tablishment Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment.""' But if the historical evidence is mixed concerning Ever-
son's first amendment conclusions, the evidence concerning "incorpora-
tion" points clearly against the Court's position. That evidence strongly
suggests that the fourteenth amendment, as originally understood, did
not incorporate the establishment clause for application to state govern-
ment action.
Unlike Justice Rehnquist, the district court in Jaffree had been un-
willing to acquiesce on the historical validity of incorporation. Reaching
a conclusion that the Supreme Court would later describe as "remarka-
ble,"'1 12 the district court had found that the fourteenth amendment did
not render the establishment clause applicable to the states and that,
therefore, the Constitution left the states free to maintain whatever
church-state relations they might desire.' 13 It is of course "remarkable"
for a lower federal court to flout well-settled Supreme Court doctrine,
but the district court's historical conclusion, in its own right, is not in the
least remarkable. To the contrary, the district court supported its deci-
sion with a careful analysis of the historical evidence regarding the adop-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.
Relying heavily on the work of Professor Charles Fairman, 4 the
district court concluded that the fourteenth amendment was not in-
tended to make any of the Bill of Rights applicable against the states:
The debates in Congress at the time the fourteenth amendment was being
drafted, the re-election speeches of the various members of Congress shortly
after the passage by Congress of the fourteenth amendment, the contempo-
raneous newspaper stories reporting the effect and substance of the four-
teenth amendment, and the legislative debates in the various state
legislatures when they considered ratification of the fourteenth amendment
indicate that the amendment ... was not intended to incorporate the fed-
eral Bill of Rights (the first eight amendments) against the states. 115
Fairman's historical analysis, of course, has not gone unchallenged," 6
111 Wallace v. Jafiree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 48 (majority opinion).
113 Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1118-26 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd sub
nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
114 Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Un-
derstanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
115 Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1119.
116 For an early attack on Fairman's work, see Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History,"
and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1954). See also Fair-
man, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954). For more recent commentary
on the historical validity of incorporation, see, for example, R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 134-56
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and the evidence suggesting a contrary historical conclusion can hardly
be dismissed as a "few stones and pebbles." 117 Given the radical effect of
incorporation in transferring power from the state to the national level,
however, it is incumbent on those opposing Fairman to present clear and
persuasive evidence in support of their position-evidence sufficiently
powerful to establish that not only the congressional framers of the four-
teenth amendment, but also its ratifiers in the various state legislatures,
in fact intended to work a truly revolutionary change in the allocation of
state and national power. This is not an easy case to make. Thus, it is
perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court in Jaffree made no real
attempt to rebut the district court's acceptance of Fairman's historical
argument; instead, the Supreme Court relied largely on the force of pre-
cedent as support for its fervent reaflirmation of the doctrine of
incorporation. 118
As the district court opinion in Jaffree suggests, it is not clear that
the fourteenth amendment was originally intended to make any of the
Bill of Rights applicable against the states.1 19 In any event, there is more
specific evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amend-
ment, whatever their intentions with respect to the Bill of Rights gener-
ally, at least did not intend to incorporate the establishment clause for
application to the states. In 1875 and 1876, after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, Congress considered, but rejected, a resolution
that was specifically designed to make the religion clauses of the first
amendment applicable to the states. The proposed "Blaine Amendment"
would have provided that "[n]o State shall make any law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 120 The
(supporting Fairman's position); L. LEvY, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, in
JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64 (1972) (agreeing that there is
little historical evidence in support of incorporation); M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (arguing that the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights); Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235, 269-75 (1984) (suggesting that the four-
teenth amendment probably was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights); and Maltz, The Four-
teenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984) (accord).
117 Fairman, supra note 114, at 134. Most notably, the historical record reveals that two of the
leading congressional proponents of the fourteenth amendment, Congressman Bingham and Senator
Howard, believed that the amendment would incorporate the Bill of Rights. See M. CURTIS, supra
note 116, at 57-91. See also Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of "This Constitution", 72 IOwA L. REv. 1177, 1256-59 (1987).
118 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 48-55.
119 There is one important exception to this proposition. The fifth amendment, applicable to the
federal government, provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In the same wording, the fourteenth amendment
extends this prohibition to the states. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1. Needless to say, the fourteenth
amendment's explicit "incorporation" of a single provision of the Bill of Rights does little to support
a broader theory of incorporation, and it may even support a negative inference to the contrary.
120 H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REc. 205 (1875) (emphasis added). Thus, just
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Blaine Amendment received considerable attention in Congress, and it
passed in the House of Representatives before being defeated in the
Senate. 121
Post-ratification congressional action or inaction is ordinarily a haz-
ardous basis for determining the original meaning of a constitutional
amendment. 122 The Congress that considered the Blaine Amendment
was not the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which had proposed the fourteenth
amendment, and, in any event, Congress's rejection of the Blaine
Amendment could have been grounded on a belief that the fourteenth
amendment had already accomplished the object of the new amendment,
making it superfluous. But the Congress that considered the Blaine
Amendment acted only eight years after the fourteenth amendment had
been ratified. It included some twenty-three members of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, two of whom had been members of the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, which had drafted the fourteenth amendment.1 23
Thus, if the Blaine Amendment had been thought superfluous in light of
the fourteenth amendment, at least some indication of this belief surely
would appear in the legislative history of the Blaine Amendment. The
historical record, however, contains no such evidence. To the contrary,
the record suggests a congressional understanding that the proposed
amendment would "prohibit[] the States, for the first time, from the es-
tablishment of religion [and] from prohibiting its free exercise." 124 The
as the fourteenth amendment copied the language of the fifth amendment's due process clause, the
Blaine Amendment copied the language of the first amendment's religion clauses. See supra note
119.
As introduced in the House of Representatives, the proposed amendment provided in full as
follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.
Id. The language of the proposed amendment was revised in the course of its consideration by the
House and Senate, but its central meaning remained the same, and its initial clause, tracking the
language of the first amendment, was not altered.
121 See 4 CONG. REc. 5189-92, 5245, 5453-57, 5561-62, 5580-95 (1876).
122 Cf Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Consti-
tutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 530 (1982) ("[J]ustifying an interpretation of a prior enactment by
pointing to what a subsequent Congress did not enact seems incompatible with our constitutional
structure.") (emphasis in original). See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND AP-
PLICATION OF STATUTES 179-83 (1975).
123 See Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 941 & n.14
(1951).
124 See 4 CONG. REC. 5561 (1876) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen). The record is replete with
evidence that the Blaine Amendment's application of the religion clauses to the states was not
thought superfluous by either the supporters or the opponents of the proposed enactment. See, e.g.,
id. at 5191 (statement of Rep. Banks) ("[I]t prohibits the States from exercising the power they now
exercise."); id. at 5245 (statement of Sen. Christiancy) ("[I]t is. .. imposing on the States what the
Constitution already imposes on the United States ...."); id. at 5454 (statement of Sen. Randolph)
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inference seems inescapable: the fourteenth amendment, as originally
understood, did not incorporate the establishment clause for application
to the states. 125
There is substantial historical evidence, then, that whatever their in-
tentions with respect to the Bill of Rights generally, the framers and ra-
tifiers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to incorporate the
establishment clause for application against the states. Although this
("It is simply an additional inhibition upon the States; no more, no less."); id at 5561 (statement of
Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("[It] extends the prohibition of the first amendment of the Constitution to the
States."); id. at 5583 (statement of Sen. Whyte) ("[The first amendment] leaves the whole power for
the propagation of [religion] with the States exclusively; and so far as I am concerned I propose to
leave it there also."); id at 5591 (statement of Sen. Bogy) ("For one hundred years the States have
existed; and for all this time they have had the power of legislation on this subject .. "); id at 5592
(statement of Sen. Eaton) ("We have got on for a hundred years without it, and I beg leave to say
that we shall get along for another hundred years without it."). See generally O'Brien, The Blaine
Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DET. L.J. 137 (1963).
125 Professor Leo Pfeffer has argued that my suggested inference is not inescapable. See L. PFEF-
FER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 147 (rev. ed. 1967). He points to the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), which were decided in the years between the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment and consideration by Congress of the proposed Blaine Amendment. In the Slaughter-
House Cases, the Supreme Court had given a narrow reading to the privileges or immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment, a reading that precluded any "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights on
the basis of that clause. Pfeffer argues that the fourteenth amendment in fact had been intended to
work such an incorporation, that the Supreme Court's decision was therefore erroneous, and that the
Blaine Amendment might have been designed to "correct" this error by explicitly "overruling" the
Court's decision.
It would have been curious indeed, however, for Congress to "correct" the Court's refusal to
sanction an incorporation of the Bill of Rights by adopting a constitutional amendment dealing only
with the establishment and free exercise of religion. It is not surprising, therefore, that the legislative
history of the Blaine Amendment belies Pfeffer's thesis. The congressional debates on the Blaine
Amendment do include a single, oblique statement that might have been directed toward the
Supreme Court's ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases. Defending the detailed language that the
Senate had added to the House version of the proposed amendment, Senator Morton commented as
follows:
It is very important to have this resolution specific. In framing constitutional amendments the
objection is that they are too general in their character. The fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments which we supposed broad, amble, and specific, have, I fear, been very much impaired by
construction, and one of them in some respects almost destroyed by construction. Therefore I
would leave as little as possible to construction. I would make them so specific and strong that
they cannot be construed away and destroyed by courts.
4 CONG. REc. 5585 (1876) (statement of Sen. Morton). But other comments by Senator Morton
undercut any claim that he believed the Blaine Amendment would simply re-enact what the
Supreme Court erroneously had failed to find in the fourteenth amendment:
[The Blaine Amendment] cannot become a part of the fundamental law unless three-fourths of
the States agree to it. We cannot take the power from the States by passing it here.... If the
States agree to it and give up this power it is all right. They have nobody to blame but them-
selves. If three-fourths of them agree to it, then it becomes the law of the land, just like any
other constitutional amendment.
Id. at 5594 (statement of Sen. Morton). The remainder of the legislative record, moreover, offers not
a trace of support for Pfeffer's argument. See supra note 124.
In his recent book, Michael Kent Curtis has advanced an argument similar to Pfeffer's in an
attempt to explain the Blaine Amendment. See M. CURTIs, supra note 116, at 169-70. Curtis's
argument is no more convincing than Pfeffer's, because it suffers from the same weaknesses.
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conclusion is firmly supported by the evidence, some might choose to
read the historical record differently. 126 I turn next, therefore, to two
additional-and even more basic-reasons for rejecting the historical va-
lidity of incorporation with respect to the establishment clause. These
reasons depend more on an analysis of language and logic than on histor-
ical evidence that some may regard as controversial, and they indepen-
dently compel a rejection of the incorporation argument.
First, there is the problem of language. By prohibiting laws "re-
specting an establishment of religion,"1 27 the establishment clause states
a limitation on the power of government. But unlike the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights, this clause does not designate any obvious individ-
ual beneficiaries. Indeed, a prohibition on establishment might serve a
variety of purposes beyond protecting the rights of particular individu-
als. 128 Thus, it is not easy to see how the language of the fourteenth
amendment, even if read broadly, can be said to incorporate this provi-
sion for application to the states.
The "incorporating" language of the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . ,,129 Putting aside the question of whether these words fairly
can be read to incorporate any of the Bill of Rights, note that the words
at least would limit any such incorporation to the protection of "privi-
leges" and "immunities" of "citizens," as well as the rights of "persons"
to be free from unlawful "deprivations" of life, liberty, or property.
These limitations would seem to exclude the establishment clause. 30
Concededly, this problem could be resolved through a skillful manipula-
tion of the pertinent constitutional language. 3' But the very need for
126 See generally R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN CON-
STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 133-70 (1987) (suggesting that the historical record is insufficient
either to establish or to refute the claim that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the religion
clauses for application against the states).
127 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
128 See infra notes 205-69 and accompanying text.
129 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130 Cf. E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 113-14 (195 1) (arguing
that the establishment clause does not protect any individual "liberty" that can properly be absorbed
within the fourteenth amendment); M. HOWE, supra note 101, at 73 ("[lI]t is not easy to see how...
laws... which, although they may respect an establishment, do not deny liberty can be made into
unconstitutional deprivations of liberty."). On the other hand, these same limitations might not im-
pose a purely textual barrier to an incorporation of the free exercise clause.
131 In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Brennan
made such an effort, arguing essentially that the establishment clause prohibition can be read as a
guarantee of religious liberty. See id. at 256-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 48-55 (1985). For a rebuttal of Brennan's argument, see P. KAUPER, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 56-57 (1964).
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such manipulation undercuts a claim that the words were originally in-
tended to have the ascribed meaning.
Second, an originalist incorporation of the establishment clause for
application to the states creates logical difficulties. The originalist con-
tention is that the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment in-
tended to incorporate by reference the Bill of Rights, making its norms-
as originally understood for application to the federal government-ap-
ply to the states in the same way. But recall the original understanding
of the Bill of Rights, and especially the narrow, federalistic purpose that
underlay the establishment clause. 132 To the extent that a provision in
the Bill of Rights, as originally understood, reflected a general principle
concerning the proper role of government and the rights of individuals,
the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment might logically
have concluded that the federal constitution should be extended to pro-
tect that principle against state as well as federal infringement. But the
establishment clause, as originally understood, did not embrace any such
general principle; it embraced only a policy of federalism on the subject
of church and state. To "incorporate" this policy of states' rights for
application against the states would be utter nonsense, for there would be
no norms to incorporate. It would be the incorporation of an empty set
of values, akin to an incorporation of the tenth amendment for applica-
tion against the states. 133
To be sure, the framers and ratifiers of the establishment clause in-
tended to preclude the federal government from taking certain action. If
we accept the Everson side of the Everson-Rehnquist historical debate, for
example, the establishment clause denied to the federal government a
broad range of power with respect to religious matters. Theoretically,
the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment could have in-
tended to "incorporate" this prohibition for application to the states,
thereby precluding the states from exercising any power with respect to
religion that was previously denied to the federal government. Even
though the establishment clause was designed to further the end of feder-
alism, its prohibitions against the federal government could be extended
to the states for other reasons. This argument would provide a set of
norms to be incorporated, thereby avoiding the problem of an empty set.
The argument would require us to assume, however, that the framers and
ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment meant to impose on the states, as a
general principle concerning the proper role of government, a rule that
had been formulated only as a means for allocating authority between the
federal and state governments. This would have been a truly radical, if
not mindless, act of incorporation, an act we should not readily impute
132 See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
133 Cf. Snee, supra note 102 (arguing that the establishment clause did not create constitutional
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to the officials who adopted the fourteenth amendment.134
The language of the fourteenth amendment, coupled with the feder-
alistic motivation for the establishment clause, make it exceedingly diffi-
cult to argue that the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment
intended to incorporate the establishment clause for application against
the states. At the very least, the problems of language and logic dis-
cussed above impose a heavy burden of persuasion on those who wish to
advance such an historical argument. Given that the historical argument
for incorporating any of the Bill of Rights is difficult, and given the cir-
cumstances surrounding the Blaine Amendment, I cannot imagine how
that burden could be met. 135
3. Inaccurate History and Judicial Activism.-As applied to federal
action, the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine can be de-
fended in originalist terms. To this extent, although Everson's reading of
the historical record is controversial, it is at least as plausible as the con-
trary reading advanced by Justice Rehnquist in Jaffree. Giving the
Court the benefit of the doubt, let us assume that the Everson view on
this matter is not merely plausible, but is historically correct.
The Court's establishment clause cases, however, almost invariably
address state, not federal, government policies, and therefore depend on a
theory of fourteenth amendment incorporation. More precisely, these
cases depend on a premise that the establishment clause prohibition on
federal action-although actually adopted to resolve federalistic con-
134 Such an act of incorporation would not have been so radical, or at least not so mindless, if the
framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment had consciously determined that the provisions of
the establishment clause henceforth should be read to embody a general principle concerning the
proper role of government and, on that understanding, should be applied against the states as well as
the federal government. Indeed, the supporters of the proposed Blaine Amendment apparently were
prepared to make such a determination. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. The fact
remains, however, that this type of incorporation decision is sufficiently unusual that we should not
readily impute it to government officials, at least not in the absence of conscious deliberation of the
sort that accompanied Congress's consideration of the Blaine Amendment.
135 Professor Ira C. Lupu has argued that nonestablishment principles can be derived directly
from the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, rendering an incorporation of the
establishment clause unnecessary. See Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the
U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 743 (1986). Cf Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 311, 324 (1986) (suggesting that an equal protection approach may render less problematic
an incorporation of the religion clauses "as a unified package of personal religious freedoms"). Lupu
relies not on the "original and particularized concern" of the equal protection clause, however, but
rather on an "evolving" modern conception of that clause, one that permits recognition of a
principle of "equal religious liberty." See Lupu, supra, at 743. Lupu's equal protection arguments
have considerable power, and to some extent complement the arguments that I offer later in defense
of the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine. See infra notes 230-57 and accompanying
text. But Lupu's arguments, no less than my own, are decidedly nonoriginalist in character. They




cerns-should be applied to the states as though it reflected a general
principle concerning the proper relationship of religion and government.
But as I have shown, such a premise cannot be justified by reference to
the original understanding of the first and fourteenth amendments, and
therefore cannot be defended as a product of originalist judicial review.
Instead, the Court is enforcing values that no set of framers and ratifiers
intended to be enforced against the states.
Assuming that the Court takes its history seriously, however, the
Court's historical premise-though inaccurate-does limit the Court to a
closed set of norms, those placed in the Constitution by the framers and
ratifiers of the first amendment. This set of norms was designed to serve
the purpose of allocating power between the federal and state govern-
ments, a purpose bearing no meaningful relationship to the purposes
served by the Court's application of these norms to the states. The
norms do fall within a closed set, however, and this provides a quantita-
tive limit 136 on the Court's use of the establishment clause as a vehicle for
imposing constitutional restraints on the majoritarian actions of state
governments. Thus, the Court can find that a state has violated the Con-
stitution only if the state's exercise of power would have been denied to
the federal government by the framers and ratifiers of the establishment
clause. This quantitative limitation confines the Court's exercise of judi-
cial review, precluding the recognition of constitutional restraints beyond
those provided by the Court's (mistaken) incorporation of the original
establishment clause restraints on federal action. On this quantitative
criterion of judicial activism, the Court's review, although it cannot
properly be regarded as originalist, is characterized by similar limitations
and is equally nonactivist.
A proper measure of the Court's judicial activism, however, must
also include a qualitative evaluation-that is, an evaluation of the extent
to which the Court's method of decision dishonors majoritarian values.
On this score, the Court's establishment clause doctrine, understood as a
product of mistaken historical analysis, stands as an extremely activist
doctrine, for it bears no meaningful relationship to majoritarian values.
Originalist judicial review can claim at least an historical majoritarian
foundation; it recognizes constitutional restraints on government, and
thus on majoritarian action, but these restraints are ones that were origi-
nally placed in the Constitution through the majoritarian process of con-
stitutional enactment. Because no group of framers and ratifiers ever
chose to impose establishment clause limitations on the states, the
Court's own imposition of those limitations has no majoritarian sanction
of this type.
Consider, moreover, the source of the Court's decisional norms if it
136 On the distinction between quantitative and qualitative measures of judicial activism, see
supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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is engaged in the process of mistaken historical analysis that I have pos-
ited: in applying establishment clause principles to the states, the Court
is using a set of norms that was adopted nearly 200 years ago to serve a
entirely unrelated purpose. On this view, any relationship between the
Court's modem constitutional doctrine and majoritarian values, past or
present, would be purely coincidental. To be sure, certain supporters of
the first amendment-those from Virginia, for example-might happily
have endorsed the modem Court's establishment clause doctrine,137 and
certain supporters of the fourteenth amendment might conceivably have
held similar individual views. But the individual views of particular
framers or ratifiers-not embodied in constitutional enactments-cannot
form the predicate for originalist judicial review. Such a selective his-
tory, again, yields no logical connection to majoritarian values.
The Court's establishment clause doctrine, then, can be viewed as a
product of mistaken history. As such, it would properly be regarded as
relatively nonactivist on a quantitative scale, but strikingly activist in its
qualitative character. This activism, moreover, would be patently
indefensible. It may be appropriate for the Court to frustrate modem
majorities in order to honor the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion.138 And it may also be appropriate, as I will argue later, for the
Court to go beyond the original understanding and determine the proper
relationship of religion and government through a thoughtful exercise of
nonoriginalist judicial review. 139 But to use inaccurate history as the ba-
sis for imposing constitutional restraints on government is absurd. If the
Court's establishment clause doctrine can be justified, it must be for
other reasons, reasons that transcend the mistaken history on which the
Court claims to rely.
4. Originalism and the Supreme Court's Subtheme.-Although the
Supreme Court's basic Everson doctrine, as implemented through the
Lemon test, requires a careful separation of religion and government, the
Court's subtheme permits the government to favor religion in certain cir-
cumstances.140 One might argue, moreover, that while the Court's Ever-
son doctrine cannot be defended in originalist terms, its subtheme can be.
In Marsh v. Chambers,1 4 1 for example, the Court conspicuously relied on
the original understanding of the Constitution as support for a "sub-
theme" ruling that upheld the constitutionality of legislative prayer. The
137 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. But ef G. BRADLEY, supra note 94, at 35-41,
130-31 (arguing that Virginia's experience in the founding era in fact was less separationist than we
have come to believe).
138 Professor Larry Simon has suggested that this assumption is not necessarily valid. See supra
note 77.
139 See infra notes 197-311 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
141 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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Court noted that the practice of legislative prayer had been specifically
approved by the First Congress, the same Congress that had framed the
first amendment, and that therefore the Court could not properly find
that this practice violates the establishment clause.142 The Court made
no pretense of applying Everson or the Lemon test. Rather, the Court in
effect recognized an exception to its usual establishment clause doctrine:
any government practice that would otherwise violate the Court's doc-
trine is immune from invalidation if the practice was specifically present
in the minds of the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment and if
they did not disapprove it.143
If the Court's Everson doctrine were itself derived from originalist
judicial review, then the Marsh exception would seem entirely appropri-
ate, for the specific intentions of the framers and ratifiers properly could
be read to limit whatever general principles they otherwise appeared to
endorse. But the Court's Everson doctrine, as applied to the states, can-
not be defended as a product of originalist review. As a result, the Ever-
son doctrine and the Marsh exception reflect a selective-and arbitrary-
use of originalist review. When a case falls within the Marsh exception,
the Court upholds the practice under attack on the ground that the fram-
ers and ratifiers did not intend to ban it. But the framers and ratifiers did
not intend to ban any of the practices that the Court has invalidated in
applying the establishment clause to the states. As an attempted exercise
of originalist judicial review, the Court's Everson doctrine is indefensible,
resting as it does on the historically inaccurate and anomalous "incorpo-
ration" of federalism-based principles. The Marsh exception, which her-
alds deference to the original understanding of the Constitution, does
nothing more than exacerbate the Court's cut-and-paste use of the histor-
ical record.
B. Process-Oriented Theories of Nonoriginalist Review
Because the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine cannot
be justified under a theory of originalist judicial review, any defense of
the doctrine must move beyond the Court's stated reliance on the origi-
nal understanding. An alternative nonoriginalist theory must be ad-
vanced to substitute for the Court's failed attempt to defend its doctrine
in originalist terms.
Although nonoiiginalist judicial review is more activist than
originalist review, some types of nonoriginalist review are less activist
than others. In particular, the process-oriented, Carolene Products-type
142 See id at 787-92.
143 Cf Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[F]idelity to the
notion of constitutional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on governmental action requires us to
impose a heavy burden on those who claim that practices accepted when the [constitutional provi-
sion] was adopted are now constitutionally impermissible.") (emphasis in original).
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models are among the least activist, because they are designed not so
much to check the majoritarian process as to perfect its procedural oper-
ation. They are comparatively less activist than other nonoriginalist
models because they are comparatively less offensive to the basic value of
majoritarian rule.144
To be taken seriously, any theory of judicial review, process-oriented
or otherwise, must consider the proper institutional role of the judiciary
in relation to the majoritarian branches of government. 145 What distin-
guishes process theory, and makes it comparatively nonactivist, is that
process theory would restrict the judiciary to a very limited institutional
role-that of policing the majoritarian process for participational imper-
fections. In the words of Professor John Hart Ely, process-oriented judi-
cial review "can appropriately concern itself only with questions of
participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice
under attack." 146
These "questions of participation" can support the judicial invalida-
tion of majoritarian decisions in two distinct settings. First, the Supreme
Court properly may invalidate majoritarian policies that directly or indi-
rectly restrict political participation. Second, the Court properly may
invalidate majoritarian policies that are not themselves addressed to
political participation if such policies would not have been adopted in the
absence of participational defects in the majoritarian process. Process-
oriented nonoriginalist review thus permits the Court to invalidate proce-
dural restrictions on political participation as well as substantive policies
that result from participational defects. 147 Each type of process-oriented
144 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
145 As Professor Neil K. Komesar has noted, the Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional
restraints on government reflects an allocation to the judiciary of decisionmaking responsibility. As
a result, Komesar urges "a comparative institutional approach to constitutional law." Komesar,
Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L.
REv. 366, 366 (1984) [hereinafter Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously]. Under this approach, the
Court would assess its own capabilities, as well as those of the government institution whose decision
is under attack, in determining which institution is better capable of addressing the social issue
involved. Only when the Court has a superior institutional ability to confront a particular issue,
writes Komesar, should it take it upon itself to overturn the challenged government decision as a
violation of constitutional law. See id. at 367-68. See also Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institu-
tional View of Making and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 191 (1987); Komesar, A
Job for the Judges" The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH.
L. REv. 657 (1988).
146 J. ELY, supra note 22, at 181. For arguments that question the feasibility of separating issues
of process from issues of substance, see, for example, Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 131 (1981), and Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
147 These two basic themes can be derived from the Supreme Court's Carolene Products footnote.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See also J. ELY, supra note 22, at 75-77. My discussion of
process theory, however, is not tied to the particular language of that footnote. See supra notes 21-
22 and accompanying text.
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review is at least arguably implicated by the Court's establishment clause
doctrine.
1. Restrictions on Political Participation.-Although she has not
rejected the originalist pedigree that the Supreme Court claims for its
establishment clause doctrine, Justice O'Connor recently has offered a
"clarification" of that doctrine that directly considers the political pro-
cess functions that it serves. 148 Justice O'Connor argues that the estab-
lishment clause "prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political com-
munity,"1 49 a prohibition that she sees amplified in Lemon's three-
pronged test. 150 According to Justice O'Connor, the "secular purpose"
and "primary effect" requirements of Lemon implement a prohibition on
"government endorsement or disapproval of religion": 15' "Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message."1 52 As Justice O'Connor views
it, the final prong of Lemon, in prohibiting an excessive government en-
tanglement with religious institutions, also serves a largely political func-
tion: such an entanglement may "give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of
the religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined
along religious lines." 153
On one reading, 154 Justice O'Connor's "clarification" can be viewed
as a process-based defense of the separationist doctrine of Everson, as
implemented through the Lemon test. So understood, Justice
O'Connor's approach may suggest a justification for the Court's doctrine
that transcends the original understanding of the first and fourteenth
amendments, and that rests instead on the functional desirability of judi-
cial enforcement of participational values. More specifically, O'Connor
may be suggesting that the Court properly may utilize the establishment
148 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149 Id
150 For a discussion of the Lemon test and its application by the Supreme Court, see supra notes
46-67 and accompanying text.
151 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See id. at 690-94 (elaborating this view
and applying it to the case at hand).
152 Id. at 688. "What is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicat-
ing a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public per-
ception, to status in the political community." Id at 692.
153 Id at 688. But cf Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether entanglement should be retained as independent prong of Lemon test).
154 Later I will argue that Justice O'Connor's observations can also be read to support the
Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine under a theory of political-moral reasoning. See in-
fra notes 233-38 & 249-52 and accompanying text.
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clause to ensure that persons are not denied fair access to the political
process on the basis of their religious affiliation or beliefs.
Viewed as a process-based argument, Justice O'Connor's position
may be persuasive to the extent that the Court's establishment clause
doctrine addresses direct or indirect barriers to political participation.
The Court's establishment clause doctrine does preclude direct barriers
to political participation, such as religion-based prohibitions on the hold-
ing of elected office, 155 and it precludes certain indirect barriers as well,
such as the exclusion from power that results from religion-based alloca-
tions of quasi-government authority.1 56 These components of the Court's
doctrine can be seen to reflect a process-oriented requirement that par-
ticipational rights not be restricted on the basis of religion.15 7
These are very minor aspects of the Court's establishment clause
doctrine, however, as the doctrine has been used to invalidate countless
government policies that bear no meaningful connection, direct or indi-
rect, to restrictions on political participation. To defend the bulk of the
Court's establishment clause doctrine, Justice O'Connor must move be-
yond restrictions on political participation and focus instead on other
evils that she perceives in laws that violate Everson and the Lemon test.
Thus, she speaks of the evil of creating "political constituencies defined
along religious lines" 158 and the evil of government "endorsement" or
"disapproval" of religion, which sends "messages" of "insider" or "out-
sider" political status.15 9 Political constituencies form along numerous
lines, however, and all government actions send "messages" of "endorse-
ment" and "disapproval." Justice O'Connor's position therefore depends
on a belief that religion is special-that religion is qualitatively different
from nonreligious matters, thereby requiring different treatment in the
political process.
As I will argue later, religion is qualitatively different from nonreli-
gious matters, thereby requiring different treatment in the political pro-
cess. 160 Thus, perhaps the Court ought to take a nonoriginalist view of
155 See, eg., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Although the plurality opinion in McDaniel
relied on the free exercise clause, the Lemon test would have required a similar conclusion under the
establishment clause as well. See id. at 636-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Cf Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (finding that religious test for public office unconstitution-
ally invades "freedom of belief and religion").
156 See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating Massachusetts stat-
ute that granted churches power to veto applications for liquor licenses to be used in their
neighborhoods).
157 Cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Glovernment
may not . . . fence out from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it regards as
overinvolved in religion. Religionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full mea-
sure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity generally.")
158 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159 Id.
160 See infra notes 205-89 and accompanying text.
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the establishment clause that works to retard the creation of religion-
based political constituencies and that works to discourage government
from sending messages that endorse or disapprove religion. But such
conclusions, however sound, cannot be defended as the product of pro-
cess theory.
Process theory is relatively nonactivist precisely because it deals
"only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive mer-
its" of majoritarian policymaking. Process theory may serve to justify
the elimination of barriers to political participation, for this task plausi-
bly can be carried out with reference only to nonsubstantive, participa-
tional values. Such values may call for a general opening of the political
process so that "the people," through their elected representatives, can
make informed substantive decisions in the crucible of a full and open
political debate that includes fair representation of all competing views.
Process theory therefore may support an open system of government that
includes a strongly enforced freedom of expression and a broad extension
of the voting franchise and access to the ballot.16' By contrast, the es-
sence of Justice O'Connor's establishment clause argument actually calls
for the Court not to open, but to restrict, the operation of the political
process by foreclosing certain types of political activity-the formation of
certain types of political coalitions and the formulation of certain types of
substantive government policies.
Justice O'Connor's approach would have the Court enforce a partic-
ular vision of politics, but a vision that cannot be derived from participa-
tional values. Instead, her approach depends on an evaluation of the
appropriate limits on substantive policymaking by majoritarian institu-
tions. Process theory may permit the Supreme Court to eliminate barri-
ers to political participation, but it does not permit the Court to restrict
the types of substantive values that such participation may be used to
advance. 162
161 As Professor Ely has noted, process theory "suggests that it is an appropriate function of the
Court to keep the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the
channels of political participation and communication are kept open." J. ELY, supra note 22, at 76.
For Ely's defense of a vigorous judicial role in policing restrictions on expression and on the right to
vote, see id at 105-25.
162 As Professor Mark V. Tushnet has suggested in commenting on an earlier version of this
Article, there is a risk that government messages of "outsider" status, at least if repeated with regu-
larity, might have the practical effect of driving the "outsiders" out of politics, thereby creating a de
facto restriction on political participation. Cf M. TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 257 n.31 (noting this
risk, but describing it as "remote"). Under this view, Justice O'Connor's approach might be de-
fended as a process-based protection of participational values, working as a prophylactic against this
possibility. But such a view would seem to push process theory to the breaking point. The Court
would be seeking to vindicate participational values based on a determination that certain citizens
would be so offended by particular government actions that they would decide to withdraw from
political participation. The offensiveness question, however, could not be answered on the basis of
participational values; instead, it would depend on the substance of challenged government actions
that, in themselves, might have no relation to political participation at all. As I will argue later, the
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2. Substantive Policies Resulting from Participational Defects.-In
addition to judicial elimination of barriers to political participation, pro-
cess theory does permit a limited judicial scrutiny of the substantive pol-
icy decisions of majoritarian officials, but it is a scrutiny informed
entirely by participational considerations. In particular, the Court may
invalidate substantive policies that would not have been adopted but for
participational defects in the political process. Professor Bruce A. Ack-
erman has explained this second type of process-based constitutional de-
cision:
[T]he court does not purport to challenge the substantive value judgments
underlying the legislative decision; instead, it simply denies that the...
statute would have emerged from a fair and open political process .... In
essence, the court is trumping the statutory conclusions of the... real-
world legislature by appealing to the hypothetical judgment of an ideally
democratic legislature. 163
An "ideally democratic legislature" would be premised on full and fair
political participation, including equally effective participation from all
quarters of society. As a result, it would include proportionate represen-
tation and political influence for all members of the political commu-
nity.164 Moreover, such a legislature would be genuinely open to the
arguments of all interested persons, and it would give fair consideration
to the merits of those arguments.165
Majoritarian institutions in the United States, however, are not "ide-
ally democratic." Even in the absence of government-imposed barriers
to participation, not all segments of society have proportionate represen-
tation in these institutions, much less a proportionate share of political
influence. Moreover, existing societal prejudices mean that the argu-
ments of certain groups may be dismissed by majoritarian officials with-
Court's establishment clause doctrine does work to further the maintenance of a religiously inclusive
political community, and one of the likely benefits of such a community is enhanced political partici-
pation. See infra notes 210-21 & 247-57 and accompanying text. But my argument, like Justice
O'Connor's, is inexorably tied to nonparticipational, substantive considerations.
163 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 715.
164 There might be difficulties in deciding who should count, for this purpose, as a member of the
political community. See generally Brilmayer, Carolene Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Out-
sider" 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1315-30 (1986) (discussing the problem of "inside-outsiders," Le.,
those who are excluded from participation in a political process, but who are nonetheless subject to
its results).
165 The focus here is on fair participatory access and influence in a representative democracy.
There are, of course, different conceptions of representative democracy, which provide different
models of the role of representative officials. Some models, for example, emphasize a role of political
bargaining in light of interest group pressures; others see representative officials engaged in a more
deliberative search for the public interest. See generally Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). Whatever the model may be, however, the representative system can be
regarded as participationally ideal if all members of the political community have proportionately
effective access to the system, whether that access means an opportunity to benefit from political
bargains or an opportunity to persuade through arguments concerning the public interest.
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out the full and fair consideration that they deserve. 166 Based on these
criteria, racial minorities traditionally have been the paradigm "politi-
cally disadvantaged" group in the United States. In fact, however, other
groups-such as women, the poor, and homosexuals-may actually face
greater participational disadvantages. 167
On issues affecting religion, religious minorities and nonbelievers
properly may be regarded as politically disadvantaged. While they may
attempt to participate at a level proportionate to their numbers in soci-
ety, these groups face a readily identifiable and potentially severe prob-
lem of prejudice-prejudgment--on the part of majoritarian officials
holding contrary religious views. Religious beliefs frequently are formed
early in life, and they are not readily subject to fundamental changes of
mind.168 Moreover, such beliefs depend substantially on commitments of
faith, which are supra-rational in character. As a result, it is hard to
imagine how a real-world majoritarian institution could give full and fair
consideration to minority arguments concerning issues that touch reli-
gion, arguments no doubt implicating matters of faith. Such arguments
likely would be viewed with a suspicion and distrust that simply could
not be overcome.
Process theory suggests that when a majoritarian decision adversely
affects a politically disadvantaged group, the judiciary may find the deci-
sion unconstitutional if it resulted from participational defects working
to the detriment of the disadvantaged group. The Supreme Court's es-
tablishment clause doctrine, moreover, works largely to the benefit of
religious minorities and nonbelievers, because the establishment clause
generally operates to invalidate government attempts to prefer dominant
religions. As a student commentator has noted, "groups in political
power are most likely to violate the establishment clause when such a
violation is somehow to their own benefit; the majority group may at-
tempt to establish its own religion or all religions but will likely not take
actions that have the purpose and effect of establishing minority reli-
gions."'169 Thus, one could attempt to defend many of the Court's estab-
lishment clause decisions as decisions based on process theory, decisions
166 Cf J. ELY, supra note 22, at 103 (arguing that a political malfunction occurs when "though
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recog-
nize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other
groups by a representative system").
167 See Ackerman, supra note 21.
168 See generally K. ROBERTS, RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 133-81 (1984) (dis-
cussing the social psychology of religious conversion and commitment).
169 Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1175, 1178 n.13 (1983) (emphasis omitted). "Legislatures are, for the most part, comprised of
representatives of the mainstream religions. It is unlikely that they would pass laws burdening main-
stream religions; it is much more likely that laws will be passed that, intentionally or not, benefit the
majority and burden minority or nonmainstream religions." Id. at 1197.
1151
82:1113 (1988)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
designed to protect the interests of minority groups unable to compete in
the political process. 170
This line of reasoning does reveal defects in the majoritarian process
when that process attempts to address matters concerning religion, and it
therefore provides support for more careful than usual judicial scrutiny
of majoritarian action. But, as with the first branch of process theory,
this branch is insufficient to justify the Court's establishment clause doc-
trine. Process theory, standing along, cannot defend the invalidation of
substantive government policies merely because those policies were
formed through a less than ideal majoritarian process. Instead, the
Court can invalidate substantive policies only if it can say, with a fair
degree of confidence, that those policies would not have been adopted if
the process had been ideal-that is, if the participational defects in the
political process had not been present. In positive terms, the Court can
invalidate majoritarian government action only to bring about substan-
tive results that would have been adopted in a participationally ideal
political process; for the Court to go beyond this limit would be for it to
leave the world of process theory and enter the realm of substantive
policymaking.
Comparing actual majoritarian policies with policies that would be
reached in a participationally ideal majoritarian process is necessarily
speculative, but process theorists can at least plausibly argue that certain
substantive policies would not have been adopted in the absence of par-
ticipational defects, and that those policies therefore should be invali-
dated to bring about contrary substantive results.17 1 There is absolutely
no reason to believe, however, that a participationally ideal majoritarian
institution would refrain--due to the removal of participational de-
fects-from adopting substantive policies furthering the interests of dom-
inant religions at the expense of religious and irreligious minorities.
It is not clear how, even hypothetically, one could "remove" par-
ticipational defects of the sort that arise from the consideration of issues
that implicate matters of faith. But even if such defects could be hypo-
thetically removed, this at most would ensure that the arguments of the
minority groups would be fully and fairly considered, rather than simply
170 Cf id. at 1197-1200 (advancing a "political process argument" to defend the Supreme Court's
basic approach to the establishment and free exercise clauses).
171 In the absence of participational difficulties faced by homosexuals, for example, legislatures
might not maintain criminal prohibitions on consensual homosexual sodomy. See Conkle, The Sec-
ond Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 225-26 (1987).
Professor Ely presents a general argument that "we-they" legislative stereotyping reflects a par-
ticipational defect that can deprive disadvantaged "they" groups of fair representation in the polit-
ical process. He suggests that this sort of stereotyping produces a distorted view of reality and
therefore may result in the adoption of substantive policies that would not have been adopted other-
wise. See J. ELY, supra note 22, at 152-70. For a summary of the major types of participational
defects that might affect majoritarian policymaking, see Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously,
supra note 145, at 373-76.
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ignored or disregarded on the basis of conflicting religious commitments.
There would be no reason to conclude that the ideal majoritarian institu-
tion would find the minority arguments persuasive. To the contrary, like
most interests that command the prima facie support of a majority of the
people and their elected representatives, the legislative interests of the
dominant religion probably would maintain support in the majoritarian
process despite a full and fair consideration of alternative arguments. In
a majoritarian democracy, even one that is participationally ideal, one
must expect that minority political interests generally will loe.172 Given
the nature and strength of religious beliefs, this is at least as true for
matters affecting religion as it is for matters purely secular.
Perhaps an ideal majoritarian institution would refrain from adopt-
ing laws that violate the Supreme Court's Everson doctrine, or perhaps it
would so refrain except when the laws fell within the Court's subtheme,
which permits the adoption of certain laws favoring religion. If so, the
Court's establishment clause doctrine could be seen as working to further
the operation of an ideal majoritarian process. But this "ideal"
majoritarian process would be ideal not on the basis of participational
considerations; rather, it would be ideal in its adherence to certain
nonparticipational values, certain substantive values concerning the
proper relationship between religion and government. Whatever the ter-
minology, such a defense of the Supreme Court's establishment clause
doctrine would have moved beyond the world of process theory, and ac-
cordingly would require a substantive justification. 173
3. Process Theory, Judicial Activism, and the Establishment
Clause.-Nonoriginalist judicial review in the service of either of the two
branches of process theory is relatively nonactivist. In quantitative
terms, this type of nonoriginalist review provides only a limited occasion
172 As Professor Ackerman has noted:
To put the point simply, minorities are supposed to lose in a democratic system--even when
they want very much to win and even when they think (as they often will) that the majority is
deeply wrong in ignoring their just complaints. This principle--call it the principle of minority
acquiescence-is absolutely central to democratic theory.
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 719 (emphasis in original).
173 As Professor Lea Brilmayer has written:
Certain values are not likely to be adequately protected by majority rule, because they are val-
ues to which the majority is likely to be hostile. When a value popular to only a few is impinged
upon by a legislature, one might then argue that there has been a defect in the democratic
processes-a value that went unprotected solely because of its unpopularity....
When "process analysis" is construed so broadly, however, any invalidation of a statute
could be seen as process-oriented because some minority's interest always goes unprotected....
For instance, if Congress establishes a state religion, the democratic process can be viewed as
having failed to respect the value of disestablishment.
Such a legislative result, however, does not mean that the democratic process has failed in
its own terms, but rather that it has failed in terms of the extrinsic values protected by the first
amendment.... The only reason that one thinks the process has failed is that there is some
substantive value that should have been protected but was not.
Brilmayer, supra note 164, at 1306-07.
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for judicial intervention, permitting the judiciary to act only when the
majoritarian process restricts political participation or reaches substan-
tive results that would not have been reached but for participational de-
fects. Moreover, the Court's method of decision is qualitatively
nonactivist, in that its identification and enforcement of participational
values can be seen to perfect the majoritarian process and therefore to
support, rather than undercut, the basic value of majoritarian rule.174
We have seen that each of the two branches of process theory pro-
vides useful insights that can help inform the role of the Supreme Court
under the establishment clause. It is important to identify participational
values and the participational defects that may infect the majoritarian
consideration of matters affecting religion. But these insights cannot in
themselves justify the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine, for
the Court's doctrine goes well beyond the correction of participational
defects. Process theory is relatively nonactivist, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, precisely because it engages the Court in a very limited
function, one that precludes the consideration of substantive values. In
defending the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine, however, a
consideration of substantive values cannot be avoided, and process the-
ory is not up to the task.
C. Common Values Theories of Nonoriginalist Review
Common values theories of nonoriginalist judicial review move the
Supreme Court beyond considerations of process and permit direct con-
sideration of substantive values. At the same time, however, these theo-
ries attempt to constrain the Court's role by limiting the Court to an
identification and enforcement of common societal values. Thus, com-
mon values theories do not authorize the Court to enforce substantive
values of its own choosing. Rather, the Court is permitted only to iden-
tify and enforce values widely supported by the national society and
therefore, in some sense at least, by the American people themselves. To
locate these values, the Court can examine factors such as statutory en-
actments, societal customs and practices, and public opinion. 175 Like
process theories, common values theories are relatively nonactivist be-
cause they are relatively inoffensive to the principle of majoritarian
rule. 176
Some common values theories are historical in orientation. They
174 On the distinction between quantitative and qualitative measures of judicial activism, see
supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
175 The best evidence of our societal values may lie in formally adopted majoritarian policies,
agreed to by elected societal leaders in the crucible of public debate. On the other hand, the views of
the general population, if otherwise ascertainable, are entitled to some consideration as well. See
generally Smith, Book Review, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 908, 913 (1984) (suggesting that the views of both
elites and the general public must be considered in determining the content of our nation's norms).
176 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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call for the judicial protection of traditional national values that have
strong support not only in the present, but also in the past. Being non-
originalist in derivation, these values do not fall within the original mean-
ing of any constitutional provision. Nonetheless, they command an
enduring support in our society, reflecting societal commitments that in
turn have created individual expectations. To ensure respect for these
commitments and protection for the expectations that they have created,
traditional values theories would permit the Supreme Court to enforce
traditional societal values by invalidating nonconforming majoritarian
policies. 177
Other common values theories are forward-looking. They see the
pattern of evolving societal thought in the United States as one that tends
to reflect positive societal development and growth. Thus, the societal
values that should be protected by the judiciary are those that fall on the
forward edge of the evolutionary progression. These include values that
have grown to command strong support in the contemporary society,
and they also include values that are not yet widely supported, but that-
in light of developing trends-are likely to prevail in the future. For-
ward-looking common values theories thus call for the Supreme Court to
further American societal progress by invalidating majoritarian policies
that conflict with contemporary or emerging national values.178
Assuming that judicial enforcement of common values is legiti-
mate, 179 the question remains whether either type of common values the-
177 Although he focuses on substantive due process in particular, Professor Ira C. Lupu has ad-
vanced a traditional values theory that could be applied with equal force to other types of non-
originalist constitutional doctrine. See Lupu, supra note 24, at 1032-54. For a similar argument, see
Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1177-87
(1980). Cf G. LEEDES, THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY
OF LEGAL THEORY 92-108 (1986) (defending substantive due process protection for society's "rea-
sonable expectations"); Kaufman, Judges or Scholar To Whom Shall We Look for Our Constitu-
tional Law?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 196-97 (1987) (arguing that "dominant long-term values"
should be consulted in constitutional adjudication); Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237, 1262-86 (1986) (discussing "neutral principles" constitutional
adjudication based on "consensus history"). See generally Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Consti-
tutional Intent, 72 IOwA L. REv. 753 (1987) (arguing that constitutional meaning should be based
on the constitutional values of "the people" today, as determined through an investigation of the
historical and contemporary relationship between constitutional ideals and ordinary politics).
178 Elsewhere I have defended a forward-looking common values approach to nonoriginalistjudi-
cial review. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 626-37. See also Conkle, supra note 31, at 23-30. Cf
Savoy, The Spiritual Nature of Equality: Natural Principles of Constitutional Law, 28 How. L.J.
809, 843-51 (1985) (presenting a forward-looking common values theory focused on shared societal
ideals).
179 This method of judicial review, like other methods, should be regarded as legitimate if it
serves a purpose sufficient to justify its intrusion on majoritarian decisionmaking. Common values
nonoriginalist review does not engage the Supreme Court directly in a search for the right answers to
political-moral problems; instead, it calls merely for the Court to enforce widely-held societal values.
This limitation is a theoretical strength to the extent that one values the principle of majoritarian
rule, for it makes this type of judicial review relatively nonactivist. This same limitation, however,
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ory is sufficient to justify the Supreme Court's establishment clause
doctrine.
1. Preserving Traditional Values.-The Supreme Court's establish-
ment clause doctrine, at least as applied to the states, cannot be traced to
the constitutional enactment of any set of framers and ratifiers, and
therefore cannot be defended as a product of originalist review. 180 This
conclusion, however, does not mean that history is irrelevant. In particu-
lar, it does not preclude a nonoriginalist, traditional values argument in
support of the Court's doctrine. Under this type of theory, the Court's
establishment clause doctrine can be defended to the extent that its con-
tent can be derived from traditional American values, even if those val-
ues have never been embodied within a formal constitutional enactment.
Traditional values, for this purpose, are values that have commanded
strong societal support historically and that continue to enjoy that sup-
port today.181
At the time of our nation's founding, the newly created American
states espoused different views on the proper relationship between reli-
gion and government. Some states, led by Virginia, embraced anti-estab-
lishment policies, but others continued to maintain or authorize
established religions. As discussed earlier, this fundamental disagreement
ensured that the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment would be
unable to agree on any general principle concerning establishment. 182 In
the decades following the first amendment's adoption, however, formal
establishments became less common, and by the middle of the nineteenth
century they had been discarded as a thing of the past. 183 A basic policy
of disestablishment thus had grown to command wide acceptance
throughout the United States. This policy, moreover, continues to be
widely respected. Indeed, in today's political culture, arguments favor-
ing the formal establishment of religion are rarely if ever advanced; they
lie beyond the realm of acceptable political discourse. Based on our soci-
operates as a theoretical weakness as well, for it limits the importance of the function that non-
originalist judicial review can serve. Such review cannot directly further the pursuit of right an-
swers, but rather can do no more than keep America "on track"-either in its adherence to
traditional values or on its path of evolutionary societal growth. The question of legitimacy thus
turns on whether this limited function is sufficiently important to justify the relatively modest intru-
sion on majoritarian policymaking that it entails.
Elsewhere I have argued that a forward-looking common values approach is legitimate, in part
on the ground that this type of nonoriginalist review can indirectly further the pursuit of right
answers. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 628-29.
180 See supra notes 77-143 and accompanying text.
181 Cf Lupu, supra note 24, at 1040 (the search must be "for values deeply embedded in the
society, values treasured by both past and present, values behind which the society and its legal
system have unmistakably thrown their weight") (emphasis omitted).
182 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
183 The last formal establishment in the United States was dissolved by Massachusetts in 1833.
See L. LEvY, supra note 92, at 38.
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ety's long-term and enduring commitment to the policy of disestablish-
ment, one can argue persuasively that disestablishment at this point has
become a traditional societal value in the United States.
Our society's basic policy of disestablishment, however, is just
that-a basic policy of disestablishment. There is an historically sup-
ported and continuing societal consensus that government should not
formally establish any "official" religion. As a result, Everson's interpre-
tation of the establishment clause to mean that "[n]either a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church"'1 4 could be defended under a
traditional values theory of nonoriginalist judicial review. This conclu-
sion is not unimportant as a theoretical matter, but it cannot justify the
more far-reaching establishment clause doctrine employed by the
Supreme Court. To justify that doctrine under this type of theoretical
approach would require a demonstration that the traditional value of dis-
establishment extends beyond a limited commitment to formal
disestablishment.
There is room for disagreement about the meaning of "formal dises-
tablishment" and therefore about the scope of our societal commitment
in this area. Nonetheless, the major components of the Supreme Court's
establishment clause doctrine cannot plausibly be defended by appeals to
an historical and contemporary societal consensus. It is not clear that
such a consensus could be found for the proposition that government
should be precluded from favoring some religions (such as mainstream
Judeo-Christian religions) over others (such as Eastern or other minority
religions).' 85 In any event, there is nothing approaching a consensus,
historical or contemporary, for the proposition that government should
be precluded from favoring religion generally, as against irreligion.18 6
184 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
185 There plainly was no such consensus in the early history of the United States:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of [the first amendment], the
general if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encour-
agement from the state so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and
the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of
state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not
universal indignation.
2 J. STORY, COmmENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874, at 630-31
(5th ed. 1891). See id., § 1871, at 628 ("lilt is impossible for those who believe in the truth of
Christianity as a divine revelation to doubt that it is the especial duty of government to foster and
encourage it among all the citizens and subjects.").
186 In our early history, most of the American people and their leaders favored government en-
couragement of religion, short of formal establishment. See generally C. ANTiEAu, A. DOWNEY &
E. ROBERTS, supra note 94. It appears that the same is true today. More than two-thirds of the
American people, for example, support state-sanctioned prayer in the public schools. See Martin,
Views on Constitution: Promises Kept, Miles to Go, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at 10, col. 1. Faced
with Supreme Court decisions that clearly preclude state-sanctioned spoken prayer, legislatures have
been forced to advance this public sentiment with a next-best alternative, state-sanctioned moments
of silence for meditation or prayer. As of 1985, at least 25 states had adopted "moment of silence"
statutes. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 & n.1 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
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These propositions, however, are fundamental components of the
Supreme Court's Everson doctrine, as implemented by the Lemon test.
The traditional value of disestablishment is inadequate to explain these
propositions, and is therefore inadequate to justify the Supreme Court's
establishment clause doctrine.
Traditional values theories are nonactivist because they limit the
Supreme Court to the enforcement of widely shared societal values. As a
result, however, these theories can work only to explain the constitu-
tional invalidation of aberrant majoritarian policies, policies that conflict
with values that have been and continue to be broadly respected in the
national society. The existence of some nonconforming policies should
not be surprising; the majoritarian support for a nonconforming policy
may be a temporary deviation from long-held values, or it may reflect the
unusual views of a particular state. When the "aberrant" policies appear
widely throughout the society, however, they appear not to be aberrant
at all, but suggest instead that the values the Court is enforcing actually
are not traditional. The Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine
obviously is not limited to the invalidation of aberrant government poli-
cies. Instead, the Court has invalidated countless government programs,
including officially sanctioned school prayer and public support for sec-
tarian schools, that have widespread support in the society. If anything,
an appeal to "traditional values" in this area would provide support for
upholding these practices, not for invalidating them.
2. Furthering Societal Progress.-Forward-looking common values
theories look to historical and contemporary societal thought in the
United States, but with an eye to the future. These theories look not for
an unchanging historical commitment to a value, but rather for a pro-
gression of changing views that suggests an unfolding path of American
societal development. Under this type of model, the nonoriginalist role
of the Supreme Court is to further societal progress by enforcing the con-
temporary and emerging societal values that fall on the forward end of
this developing pattern. 187
To the extent that a forward-looking common values theory focuses
on contemporary societal values, it calls for the Court to enforce values
that, because of a developing historical pattern of change, have grown to
command strong support in modern society. One could use this type of
reasoning to defend the same establishment clause principle that can be
defended under a traditional values approach, namely, the Supreme
judgment). See generally Smith, supra note 175, at 914 (suggesting that our contemporary national
norms "exclude extreme practices such as establishing specified churches, but they permit a range of
more moderate responses to issues such as religion in the public schools and the financing of reli-
gious schools").
187 For an argument that this type of model can explain many of the modem Supreme Court's
nonoriginalist decisions, see Conkle, supra note 6, at 631-36.
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Court's enforcement of a policy of formal disestablishment. Citing our
society's early movement away from formal establishment,18 8 the analy-
sis here would emphasize that the modem consensus on this question is
not merely a product of enduring historical commitment, but one that
initially arose from a pattern of changing societal thought. The fact of
change, on this view, suggests societal progress, albeit progress made well
over a century in the past. Having thus reached this point of societal
development, America ought not be permitted to regress through the
adoption of majoritarian policies that would return us to the now re-
jected era of formal establishment.
This type of forward-looking common values theory provides the
same support for a policy of formal disestablishment as does a traditional
values approach. Also like a traditional values approach, however, it
cannot support the major thrust of the Supreme Court's establishment
clause doctrine. Although its chronological perspective differs, this the-
ory still requires a contemporary societal commitment before a value
properly can be protected by the Supreme Court. And as I have shown,
there is no persuasive evidence of a contemporary societal consensus that
would go beyond the bare policy of formal disestablishment. 189
Forward-looking common values theories sometimes urge a more
expansive role for the Supreme Court, one that would permit the Court
to reach beyond the present in a search for emerging societal values.
Under such an approach, the Court could attempt to hasten the advance
of developing societal thought by enforcing values not yet accepted by
the society, but values that nonetheless are likely to be accepted in the
future. In the establishment clause context, this approach would not
limit the Court to an enforcement of the contemporary value of formal
disestablishment, but instead would permit the Court to enforce a
broader vision of church-state separation if that vision found support in
the emerging values of the American society.
To count as a common values method of nonoriginalist judicial re-
view, the Court's function must be limited to the enforcement of values
that are at least in some sense drawn from the society itself. A search for
emerging American values, therefore, cannot be based merely on un-
cabined speculation concerning the future. Instead, it must be based on
an analysis of the societal thought of the present, as well as the historical
pattern from which that existing thought has developed. The search is
for a demonstrable trend in societal thinking that makes it possible to
draw reasonable inferences concerning where that trend might lead.
There are occasions on which such trends exist, trends that may
support some aspects of the modem Court's nonoriginalist decisionmak-
188 See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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ing. 190 In an era of the "Reagan revolution" and the "Moral Majority,"
however, it would be fanciful to suggest that there is an identifiable trend
of societal thinking concerning the proper relationship between religion
and government, much less a trend that would support the separationist
philosophy that the Court has enunciated in its decisions. 191 That sepa-
rationist philosophy has been and remains a matter of vigorous public
debate and controversy. Indeed, it would appear, that we are moving less
toward any type of consensus on this matter than toward a state of in-
creased polarization and divisiveness. In any event, there is no identifi-
able trend of societal thinking that points toward a future consensus
favoring either the Supreme Court's philosophy of separation or the
more specific embodiment of that philosophy reflected in the Lemon test.
As a result, the Court's establishment clause doctrine cannot be defended
by reference to a forward-looking theory of emerging societal values.
3. Common Values and the Supreme Court's Subtheme.-As dis-
cussed earlier, the Supreme Court's separationist doctrine is complicated
by a prominent subtheme, one that permits the government to favor reli-
gion in selected circumstances. 192 In upholding government practices
that cannot fairly be read to comply with Everson or the Lemon test, the
Court has relied not only on the original understanding of the first
amendment, 193 but also on the presence of traditional societal support for
the particular government practices in question. 194 This line of reasoning
might suggest a common values approach to nonoriginalist judicial re-
view, one grounded on the protection of traditional societal values. Such
an approach cannot support the Court's basic Everson doctrine, but per-
haps it could nonetheless support the Court's subtheme.
Although superficially appealing, a traditional values defense of the
Supreme Court's subtheme is unavailing. In the first place, the Court has
invalidated certain government practices that appear to be as strongly
supported by traditional values as other practices that the Court has up-
190 See Conkle, supra note 6, at 634-36.
191 Cf Van Alstyne, supra note 109, at 785-87 (arguing that American history reveals a gradual
but ever-increasing affiliation between Christianity and government).
192 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
194 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), for example, the Supreme Court upheld the
practice of legislative prayer based not only on the original understanding of the first amendment,
but also on the existence of an enduring American tradition that had rendered this practice "part of
the fabric of our society." Id. at 792. See also id. at 786-92. Likewise, in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970), the Court's approval of property tax exemptions for churches was grounded in part
on their traditional support in our society, support that the Court found "deeply embedded in the
fabric of our national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times." Id. at 676. See also id.
at 676-78. "[A]n unbroken practice of according the exemption to churches... is not something to
be lightly cast aside." Id. at 678. Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (contending that this type of historical argument "must always be focused on the particu-
lar practice at issue in a given case").
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held.195 A theory of traditional values cannot explain this inconsistency.
But there is a more fundamental theoretical problem: if a traditional
values theory cannot explain the Supreme Court's basic Everson doctrine,
how can we expect it to explain the subtheme? The Court's subtheme
identifies what amounts to an exception to the general rule of separation
reflected in Everson and the Lemon test. That general rule, however, can
be defended only on the basis of something other than a theory of tradi-
tional values. If a contradictory subtheme is to be justified, it must be on
terms consistent with whatever theory informs the basic doctrine itself.
The subtheme does not stand alone, and therefore cannot be defended in
isolation.
4. Common Values, Judicial Activism, and the Establishment
Clause.-Whether under a traditional or a forward-looking approach,
nonoriginalist judicial review based on the enforcement of common val-
ues is relatively nonactivist. Quantitatively, the level of judicial invalida-
tion is low, for majoritarian institutions are not inclined to depart from
traditional or contemporary societal values, and only rarely will an iden-
tifiable trend support judicial invalidation on the basis of emerging val-
ues. Qualitatively, this type of judicial review cals for the Supreme
Court to draw its decisional norms from society itself; even as it invali-
dates particular majoritarian actions, the Court is enforcing values that
have "majoritarian" support of their own, support reflected in the long-
term pattern of national societal thought.196
Either a traditional values approach or a more forward-looking
common values theory can justify nonoriginalist constitutional protec-
tion for a societal value favoring formal disestablishment. This conclu-
sion is not insignificant, but it cannot support the major components of
the Supreme Court's separationist doctrine, nor can it support the
Court's contradictory subtheme.
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND POLITICAL-MORAL
REASONING: AN ACTIVIST THEORY OF CHURCH-STATE
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Neither originalism nor the relatively nonactivist varieties of non-
195 At the time of the Court's school prayer decision in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), for
example, "the habit of putting one sect's prayer in public schools had long been practiced." Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 702 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). As a result, the Court's decision
was broadly "disruptive of traditional state practices." Id. at 703. But cf. Stone, In Opposition to the
School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 834 (1983) (suggesting that the strength of this
tradition has been exaggerated). See generally School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 266-78 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing history of prayer and religious exer-
cises in American public schools).
196 On the distinction between quantitative and qualitative measures of judicial activism, see
supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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originalist theory can explain the Supreme Court's establishment clause
doctrine. Originalism fails because it cannot support the Court's criti-
cally important "incorporation" of the establishment clause for applica-
tion to the states. 197 Process theory can explain only that tiny portion of
the Court's doctrine that deals with religion-based limitations on political
participation. 198 Common values theory likewise has only a limited role
to play; it can justify the Court's enforcement of a policy of formal dises-
tablishment, but that policy is so widely respected in the United States
that it hardly requires judicial protection.1 99 In sum, these various theo-
ries might support selected applications of the Supreme Court's establish-
ment clause jurisprudence, but they cannot begin to provide a coherent
and comprehensive justification either for the Court's basic Everson doc-
trine or for its contradictory subtheme.
To be defended comprehensively, the Court's establishment clause
doctrine must be justified on the basis of a theory of political-moral rea-
soning. Under such an approach, the Supreme Court is not limited to
the original understanding of the Constitution, nor is it limited to an
enforcement of participational values or substantive values widely ac-
cepted in society. Instead, the Court is broadly entrusted with a search
for the right answers to political-moral problems, answers to be formu-
lated on the basis of reasoned arguments of principle and policy.200
Needless to say, this type of decisionmaking role is fundamentally antag-
onistic to the concept of majoritarian rule and therefore, on this criterion,
must be regarded as exceedingly activist. 201 As a result, anyone seeking
to defend such a role must carry a heavy burden of justification, much
heavier than the burden faced by advocates of originalism or the less
activist versions of nonoriginalist review.
In the remainder of this Article, I will attempt to shoulder this bur-
den by advancing a political-moral reasoning theory of the establishment
clause. I will defend the basic contours of the Supreme Court's establish-
ment clause doctrine, including its dominant separationist component
and its contradictory subtheme, on two related grounds: first, that the
Court's doctrine is sound as a matter of political-moral theory; and sec-
ond, that the Court is the proper institution to formulate and apply a
doctrine of this sort. My analysis is limited to the Supreme Court's doc-
trine as it concerns traditional-typically theistic-religion. 202 My goal,
197 See supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 144-74 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 175-96 and accompanying text.
200 Professor Ronald Dworkin has suggested that it may be appropriate for certain purposes to
distinguish "principles" from "policies." See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 22-28. For pres-
ent purposes, however, such a distinction is not important, and I mean to embrace reasoned argu-
ments of all types, whether relating to "principles" or "policies."
201 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
202 I make no attempt to evaluate whether the Court's doctrine should be extended to govern-
ment action based upon or relating to other forms of philosophical thought that some might regard
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moreover, is not so much to evaluate the validity of particular decisions
as it is to suggest a theoretical basis for the broad features of the Court's
decisionmaking in this area.
When I say that the Court's doctrine is "sound as a matter of polit-
ical-moral theory," I do not mean to suggest that the Court has reached
a resolution of church-state questions consistent with some type of over-
arching philosophical system of political-moral truth. Instead, I mean
only that the major features of the Court's doctrinal approach are
strongly supported by arguments of principle and policy and that, as a
result, the Court's doctrine makes America a fundamentally stronger so-
ciety, both politically and morally. America is politically stronger to the
extent that it embraces principles and policies that work to protect the
viability of our political institutions and to ensure their efficient and effec-
tive operation. It is morally stronger to the extent that it embraces prin-
ciples and policies that are just and right. These considerations overlap,
because a morally stronger society is likely to be politically stronger as
well. 203
Arguments of principle and policy in defense of the Court's estab-
lishment clause doctrine are not new. Indeed, a number of the argu-
ments presented here are supported in part by opinions from the
Supreme Court itself.204 In the Court's opinions, however, arguments of
this type generally are tied to the Court's mistaken assumptions concern-
ing the original understanding of the first and fourteenth amendments. I
seek here to isolate my discussion from any originalist constitutional
predicate and to evaluate whether arguments of principle and policy, in
their own right, can justify what is in fact a starkly activist form of non-
originalist judicial review.
Under a theory of political-moral reasoning, the Court can consider
reasoned arguments drawn from any source. As a result, it can embrace
arguments that are unpersuasive when offered in connection with less
as "religious." For discussions of the complex problem of defining religion for purposes of the first
amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses, see, for example, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STrUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (2d ed. 1988); Choper, Defining "Religion" in'the First Amendment, 1982
U. ILL. L. REv. 579; Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion",
71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 753 (1984); Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Reli-
gion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. RFv. 805 (1978); and Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 1056 (1978).
203 Needless to say, I believe that reasoning about principles and policies is a productive enter-
prise and that certain answers to political-moral problems may be demonstrably better than others.
Professor Michael J. Perry recently has offered powerful support for this position. See M. PERRY,
supra note 73, at 7-54. See also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 76-86 (1986).
204 Professor Michael E. Smith has carefully catalogued and analyzed the policy justifications
presented by Supreme Court justices in support of their interpretations of both the establishment and
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activist constitutional theories. Thus, arguments made by individual
framers of the first amendment may be relevant here-not on the basis of
originalist theory, but rather for whatever intrinsic merit the arguments
may hold. Likewise, a political-moral reasoning model can evaluate "de-
fects" in the political process regardless of whether those defects are
strictly participational, and it might consider the presence of a societal
consensus favoring formal disestablishment to be a pertinent factor in
developing a more far-reaching doctrine concerning the relationship be-
tween religion and government. More generally, however, the Court can
look to reasoned arguments not tied in any way to a less activist theory of
judicial decisionmaking, for the Court's overriding goal is to formulate
political-moral principles and policies that are sound-principles and
policies that make America stronger and better than it would be in their
absence.
A. Factors Informing the Proper Relationship Between Religion and
Government in the United States
At least three broad considerations are relevant in addressing the
proper relationship between religion and government in the United
States. The first focuses on the need to respect the religious and irrelig-
ious beliefs of individuals. The second concerns the importance of main-
taining a political community that embraces its members without regard
to their religion. The third concerns the value of religion itself in Ameri-
can society.
1. Respecting Religious and Irreligious Beliefs.-Religious beliefs
are special, and especially important, to the individuals who hold them.
Although the nature of these beliefs is not the same for all believers, cer-
tain characteristics are common. First, a person's religious beliefs typi-
cally provide a general structure of thought through which the person
views the world, and a system of ethics through which he guides and
evaluates his own conduct. Second, these beliefs are likely to be based on
faith and emotion as well as reason. Third, they frequently rest in sub-
stantial part on concerns about the spiritual consequences of one's beliefs
and conduct-most notably, concerns relating to spiritual life after phys-
ical death.20 5
Religious beliefs, by their very nature, form a central part of a per-
son's belief structure, his inner self. They define a person's very being-
his sense of who he is, why he exists, and how he should relate to the
world around him. A person's religious beliefs cannot meaningfully be
205 Dean Jesse H. Choper has argued that an "extratemporal consequences" definition of religion




separated from the person himself; they are who he is.206 The essential
identity of a person and his religious beliefs means that these beliefs often
will be grounded on intense convictions. Although religious beliefs are
subject to reevaluation and possible change, they tend to endure. For a
person to challenge his own religious beliefs in any fundamental way is
for him to challenge his sense of self, a sense of self that may depend on
faith and that may give rise to eternal consequences. Challenges of this
sort are difficult at best and traumatic at worst.
Challenges to a person's religious beliefs may come not from within,
but from without. In a religiously pluralistic society such as ours, these
challenges are not uncommon; religious believers frequently attempt to
persuade and convert those with differing views. These efforts at persua-
sion and conversion are inoffensive if they are premised on a basic respect
for the existing belief structure of the person whose beliefs are being chal-
lenged. Otherwise, however, the efforts may be deeply offensive to that
person. Attacks on a person's religious beliefs are attacks on his concep-
tion of himself as a human being; if the challengers suggest that the per-
son's existing beliefs are deeply flawed and not entitled to respect, they
therefore are suggesting that the person himself is deeply flawed and not
entitled to respect. Is it any wonder that attempts at religious persuasion
and conversion are widely regarded as "sensitive" undertakings? They
are sensitive because they carry the risk of deeply affronting the person
whose religious beliefs are being questioned.
As this discussion suggests, religious beliefs are strong, but at the
same time fragile. They are strong because they are deeply embedded in
the person's self. They are fragile for essentially the same reason.
Although a person can ignore-brush off-certain types of insults, he
cannot easily ignore a challenge to his self-identity. In most cases, chal-
lenges of this sort will not change a person's religious beliefs, given the
strength and resilience of such beliefs. But the challenges are likely to
cause harm; they may amount to an assault on the person's most funda-
mental sense of being, inflicting a type of psychological injury, a form of
mental anguish.207 This mental anguish, moreover, may lead in turn to
feelings of resentment and ill will toward those who have issued the chal-
lenge and thereby caused the pain.
The person's mental anguish, and his feelings of alienation and re-
sentment, may be only temporary if he has no continuing relationship
with those who have affronted him. If, on the other hand, there is a
continuing relationship, his injury is compounded. The feelings of
anguish, alienation, and resentment will linger, and the relationship itself
206 I am using "he" and "him" in their generic-not their gender-specific--senses.
207 Cf Smith, supra note 204, at 93 ("Intrusion into parts of our psyche, especially the realm of
religious belief, may be too painful and destructive of our psychological well-being.").
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will suffer. The more important that relationship to the person affronted,
the greater his injury.
Paradoxically, irreligious beliefs-beliefs grounded on a self-con-
scious rejection of religion-bear important similarities to religious be-
liefs. In rejecting religion, an irreligious individual necessarily confronts
the fundamental questions of who he is, why he exists, and how he
should relate to the world around him. His resolution of these questions
may well depend in part on emotion, and in part on a consideration of
whether spiritual consequences may flow from the decision. Although
perhaps not to the same extent as religious beliefs, irreligious beliefs also
form a central part of a person's belief structure and constitute a type of
self-definition. Like religious beliefs, they tend to be intensely felt, and
they are both strong and fragile in the same way. As a result, attacks on
irreligious beliefs also may affront the individual who holds them, caus-
ing anguish, alienation, and resentment, and damaging his relationship
with those who have affronted him.
A proper respect for the individual members of our society requires
that they be spared unnecessary injury, including psychological injury.
Because religious and irreligious beliefs are fragile as well as strong, they
are unusually susceptible to damaging assaults, assaults arising from the
communication of messages that challenge the validity of a person's be-
liefs.208 As a result, religious and irreligious beliefs are entitled to special
respect and special protection.20 9
2. Maintaining a Religiously Inclusive Political Community.-We
all are members of various, overlapping communities. These communi-
ties are based on family relationships, for example, or relationships be-
tween coworkers, neighbors, or friends. Many of us are members of
religious communities. Whatever the context, a community-at least as
I use the term-cannot exist without a feel of connectedness and mutual
obligation, and the community's membership is defined accordingly.
Each member of a community, in order to be a member of that commu-
nity, must feel a sense of attachment, which in turn gives rise to a sense
of loyalty. This loyalty makes individual members of a community will-
208 It may be that certain nonreligious beliefs stand in a similar posture. If so, perhaps they
should be regarded as "religious" or "irreligious" for this purpose. See generally supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
209 Nothing I have said in this section depends on a claim that religious and irreligious beliefs
should be protected based on the value of "personal autonomy," defined as individual freedom to
control one's own decisionmaking. Such beliefs may or may not be the product of "personal auton-
omy" in this sense. Many religious believers, for example, expressly disclaim personal credit or
responsibility in the selection of their religious beliefs, claiming instead to have been called by God to
hold the beliefs that they do. See generally Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Lib-
erty, 18 CONN. L. REv. 779, 788-92 (1986) (suggesting that autonomy is not a helpful concept in this
area). For an autonomy-based defense of a principle of "equal respect for conscience" under the
religion clauses, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-162 (1986).
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ing, and perhaps anxious, to take actions that further the interests of the
community, sometimes at the expense of their own individual inter-
ests.210 Communities differ in the degree of loyalty that they command,
of course, because some communities are stronger and more vibrant than
others.
With respect to government affairs, there exists in the United States
a community that consists of those who regard themselves politically as
Americans-a political community composed of those United States citi-
zens211 who feel at least some loyalty to the community. 212 The strength
of this political community is a function of two factors: first, the percent-
age of citizens who regard themselves as members; and second, the de-
gree of their loyalty.213 We can nourish the American political
community through actions of embracement-actions that maintain or
expand the membership of the community or that maintain or strengthen
the loyalty of its members. Conversely, we can weaken the community
through actions of exclusion-actions that restrict the community's
membership or that reduce the loyalty of its members.
A community relationship is reciprocal, a relationship between an
individual and the community. A citizen's relationship to the American
political community therefore depends on the relationship of that com-
munity to him. His regard for the community depends on the commu-
nity's regard for him. His sense of belonging depends on the
community's treatment of him as a respected member.
The American political community expresses itself most clearly
through the adoption of government policies. These policies may for-
mally embrace or exclude an individual as a member, as, for example, in
connection with eligibility requirements for voting or other political par-
210 As Professor Frederick Schauer has noted, "a meaningful sense of community exists only
insofar as the individuals who comprise that community are willing to take actions on behalf of the
community not only that they would not take on their own behalf, but that are quite possibly detri-
mental to their own interests." Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Iden-
tity, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1504, 1504 (1986).
211 It may be that certain noncitizens also should be regarded as potential members of the Ameri-
can political community. See Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDAIES: NATIONAL
AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMrrs 1 (1981). For convenience, however, I will refer to all potential mem-
bers of the American political community as "citizens." See generally Schauer, supra note 210, at
1512-17 (suggesting that citizenship could serve as a bond of community in the United States).
212 For convenience, I speak of one political community. Of course, there actually are a number
of political communities in the United States, existing at the state and local as well as the national
levels.
213 Professor Kenneth L. Karst has argued that the American political community is tied to-
gether by "the American civic culture-a mixture of behavior and belief that infuses our law and our
institutions, transcending race, religion, and ethnicity, allowing individual citizens to preserve their
separate cultural identities and still identify themselves as Americans." Karst, Paths to Belonging:
The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REv. 303, 363 (1986). See also id. at 361-77. See
generally IL DWOkKIN, supra note 203, at 195-216 (arguing that to be a "true" associative commu-
nity, a political community must be "a community of principle").
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ticipation. They also may embrace or exclude informally; this occurs
when the policies send messages to the individual concerning his status in
the eyes of the community.
Government policies endorsing religious or irreligious beliefs send
messages that informally embrace those whose beliefs are endorsed and
that informally exclude those whose beliefs are rejected. The embrace
may strengthen the community bond of those to whom it is directed, but
if that bond is already solid, the gain is likely to be modest. Far more
important is the potential for exclusion, for existing bonds of community
can be severely weakened, if not severed altogether. The potential dam-
age 'from exclusion generally will exceed the potential gain in loyalty that
may come from the embracing effect of the government's messages. As a
result, the safer course is for the community to avoid the excluding ef-
fects of religious or irreligious messages.
Government policies that endorse nonreligious beliefs also send
messages, messages that might have the damaging effect of exclusion.
Religious and irreligious messages, however, carry an especially potent
exclusionary force. As we have seen, religious and irreligious beliefs lie
at the core of individual self-identity. An attack on these beliefs there-
fore tends to engender mental anguish and a resulting resentment toward
those who have made the attack; the individual's relationship with them
can be severely damaged.214 In adopting government policies that en-
dorse religious or irreligious beliefs, the political community becomes the
attacking party, and the relationship harmed is the individual's relation-
ship to that community. The community has shown a lack of regard for
the individual by adopting policies that conflict with his most fundamen-
tal beliefs. Indeed, because these beliefs define the person's very sense of
being, the community's action may be viewed as an assault not merely on
the person's beliefs, but on the person himself. The community has
shown a lack of respect, a sense that it does not regard the individual as
one of its own.215 The individual's reciprocal sense of belonging will be
shaken. His loyalty to the community will be weakened, perhaps dra-
matically, and he may even withdraw from the community altogether.216
214 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
215 Cf A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 236 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner ed. 1966)
("from this day you are a stranger among us").
216 Although its discussion was framed in originalist terms, the Supreme Court suggested this
point in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962):
[The establishment clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government.... The history of governmentally established religion, both in England
and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form
of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect, and even
contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.
Id. at 431. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805-06 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[No
American should at any point feel alienated from his government because that government has de-
clared or acted upon some 'official' or 'authorized' point of view on a matter of religion."). But see
M. TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 257 n.31 (suggesting that "symbolic exclusion" reflects nothing more
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Maintaining a strong political community is exceedingly important,
and in a society as religiously pluralistic as ours, 217 we must attempt to
avoid the weakening effects of religious and irreligious exclusions. By
maintaining a religiously inclusive political community, we lessen the
risk of religiously-motivated civil unrest and violence, a problem that
cannot be discounted in light of historical and contemporary events in
America and elsewhere.218 Beyond this, we encourage all of our citizens,
regardless of religion, to respect our political system and to voluntarily
obey the laws it produces.21 9 Moreover, if citizens respect the political
system, they are more likely to participate politically, making the system
more broadly representative and therefore more responsive to the inter-
ests of those within its governing reach. Finally, if their sense of loyalty
is strong, citizens may even make individual sacrifices for the good of the
community, sacrifices that may be especially important during times of
war or other national emergency. 220 For all these reasons, we should
strive to maintain a religiously inclusive political community and avoid
the "political divisiveness" that would otherwise result.221
than "the disappointment felt by everyone who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics" and poses
only a "remote" risk that the disadvantaged individuals will actually withdraw from politics).
217 Literally hundreds of Christian and non-Christian religions are practiced in the United States
today. Approximately 80% of the American people follow some type of Christian religion; 2-3% are
Jewish. The remainder-numbering in the tens of millions-belong to other religions, such as Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism, or various Native American religions, or do not adhere to any religion at all.
For a summary of the evidence supporting these conclusions, see Karst, supra note 213, at 360 &
n.364. See generally Smith, Relations Between Church and State in the United States, With Special
Attention to the Schooling of Children, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4-10 (1987) (discussing the historical
and contemporary character of religious diversity in the United States).
218 In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court emphasized the history of religious
violence and persecution in Europe and the American colonies. See id. at 8-11. Religious violence
and persecution, moreover, obviously continue to be serious problems in various parts of the world
today, including Northern Ireland, India, and various parts of the Middle East.
219 Compare James Madison's statement in his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments": "[A]ttempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so great a
proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society." J.
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 70 (1947) (appendix to dissenting opinion of Justice
Rutledge).
220 By virtue of the example that it sets, a religiously inclusive political community also may
support the maintenance of religiously inclusive private communities and the avoidance of private
ostracism and discrimination along religious lines.
221 In its establishment clause cases, the Supreme Court frequently has expressed concern about
"political divisiveness" along religious lines. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252-53
(1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). This concern can be understood in part
to reflect the risks to the political community that result from religious or irreligious exclusions. At
least to that extent, the Court's concern is well-grounded. But cf Gaffney, Political Divisiveness
Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24
ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 233 (1980) (arguing that the Court has "misconstrue[d] the purpose of the
first amendment as a mandate for consensus politics").
Professor Michael E. Smith has suggested that a fear of political divisiveness along religious
lines has little relevance in the United States today. See Smith, supra note 204, at 96-97, 107. To the
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3. Protecting the Role of Religion in American Society.-Although
some Americans are irreligious, America is a broadly religious society.
This was true at the time of the nation's founding, it has been true
throughout our history, and it is true today. All but a small fraction of
Americans believe in a Supreme Being, and a large majority consider
religion an important part of their lives.222 In the words of Justice Doug-
las, "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." 22
3
For at least three reasons, religion in America is valuable and should
be protected. First, we should protect religion for its own sake, on the
premise that religion has intrinsic value and that at least some religious
beliefs are true and valid. I make no defense of this premise here; I am
not a theologian, and this is not a theological treatise. The vast majority
of Americans operate on this premise, however, and it therefore seems
appropriate to accept it as a given.224
Second, religion has instrumental value. On an individual level, reli-
gion frequently enhances feelings of self-worth and personal satisfaction,
thereby contributing to the psychological well-being of religious believ-
ers.225  In the United States, moreover, religious norms and societal
norms tend to overlap. Although there are important examples to the
extent that he is talking about widespread religious violence and persecution, Smith may be right.
Our society may not be capable of a Nazi Holocaust. On the other hand, the winds of social change
can be unpredictable, and this is hardly the type of risk that we can afford to take lightly. In any
event, as I have suggested, religious and irreligious exclusions from the political community can
weaken our political system in less serious ways, and there is no reason to believe that these lesser
but still important types of damage cannot occur in our present society.
It may be, as Professor Smith suggests, that nonreligious political divisiveness sometimes may
cause serious damage to the political community. See id. at 97. If so, that might support the devel-
opment of a constitutional doctrine to protect the political community in those nonreligious con-
texts. But it would in no way reduce the importance of protecting the community in the religious
context discussed here.
222 According to one recent survey, 96% of all Americans believe in God or a Supreme Being.
Los Angeles Times Survey, "Religion and Politics," Question No. 61 (July 1986) (available on
microfiche). According to another survey, religion is "very important" to 57% of the American
population, and "fairly important" to another 29%. CBS/New York Times Poll, "Catholics in
America," Question No. 53 (August 1987) (available on microfiche). 61% belong to a church, con-
gregation, or synagogue, and 57% attend religious services at least once or twice a month. Id.,
Question Nos. 50 & 51. See also Report Shows Church Membership in U.S. is Growing Slowly, N.Y.
Times, June 15, 1987, at 12, col. 3. See generally Smith, supra note 217, at 24 ("Compared to other
western countries, religious belief is unusually widespread in the United States.").
223 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
224 Any theory that would reject this premise would itself be destined for rejection in the Ameri-
can society as it stands. Cf. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306
(1962) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God .... ).
225 See Gallup, Religion in America, 480 ANNALS 167, 169-70 (1985). These individual benefits
may flow in part from communal relationships with other believers. See M. TUSHNET, supra note
14, at 272-74; Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion
and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1579, 1600-02 (1987).
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contrary,226 religion in the United States tends to promote voluntary
compliance with secular laws as well as nonlegal societal norms. More-
over, most religions encourage private altruism to one degree or an-
other,227 further benefiting society and reducing the need for government
involvement in the protection of disadvantaged citizens. 228
Finally, religion can play a symbolic role in nourishing the Ameri-
can political community. As I have discussed, the political community
may suffer serious damage when it excludes on the basis of religious or
irreligious beliefs. On the other hand, the community is strengthened by
feelings of connectedness. Feelings of connectedness are enhanced when
the community recognizes the common characteristics and common in-
terests of its members. If these similarities have a history, the members
of the community can recognize the existence of a common heritage,
adding to the unifying effect. In American society, religion can serve as
the source of both present-day similarity and historical heritage, thereby
performing a symbolic, unifying function. 229 It is important to note,
however, that when the political community uses religion in this fashion,
it not only will gain from the unifying effect, but also suffer from the
religious and irreligious exclusions that will inevitably result.
There is an obvious tension within the three broad factors that I
have discussed. The first two factors require a respect for irreligious as
well as religious beliefs, both for the sake of the individuals holding those
beliefs and for the sake of the political community. Yet the third factor
suggests that religion has special value, or, to put the tension more
clearly in focus, it suggests that religion is more valuable than irreligion.
There is no direct conflict here, for my arguments concerning the need to
protect irreligious beliefs do not depend on an assumption that irreligion
226 Some of the more prominent of these examples are revealed in the Supreme Court's free exer-
cise decisions, which typically address situations in which religious norms directly or indirectly con-
flict with secular laws. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 21.6-21.9 (1986) (discussing the
Supreme Court's free exercise decisions).
227 Research suggests that the religiously committed "are vitally concerned about the betterment
of society" and participate far more than others in a variety of charitable activities. See Gallup,
supra note 225, at 170.
228 As Justice Brennan has noted, religious organizations "contribute to the well-being of the
community in a variety of non-religious ways, and thereby bear burdens that would otherwise either
have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone to the detriment of the community." Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
All of my claims concerning the instrumental benefits of religion are empirical and, to some
extent, they are culturally and historically contingent.
229 Cf R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
60 (1984) ("[WMhether it is called the Judeo-Christian ethic, or Christianity, or the operative social
values, or a civil religion, it is the dynamic of religion that holds the promise of binding together
(religare) a nation in a way that may more nearly approximate civitas.").
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may have intrinsic, instrumental, or symbolic value. Nonetheless, the
tension is both undeniable and unavoidable. As I am about to demon-
strate, however, the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine gives
due regard to each of the three factors that I have identified, and thereby
works to mitigate the tension that exists.
B. A Political-Moral Defense of the Supreme Court's
Separationist Doctrine
The dominant theme of the Supreme Court's establishment clause
doctrine is the separationist philosophy that the Court first embraced in
Everson. That philosophy has been given more concrete formulation in
the Court's three-part Lemon test. Under Lemon, government action vi-
olates the establishment clause if it lacks a secular purpose, if it has the
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or if it
fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion.230
Can this separationist doctrine be justified under a theory of poli-
tical-moral reasoning? In light of the three general factors discussed
above,231 I believe that it can. More specifically, I believe that the
Court's separationist doctrine is sound because it gives religious and irre-
ligious beliefs the special protection that they deserve, safeguards our
political community from the damaging effects of religious and irrelig-
ious exclusions, and at the same time protects the important role of reli-
gion in American society.
1. Respecting Religious and Irreligious Beliefs.-Individuals can
suffer serious damage from actions that assault their religious or irrelig-
ious beliefs. 232 As a result, the government should respect these individ-
ual beliefs, and it should encourage its citizens to do likewise in their
private conduct. The Lemon test can be understood to further these
goals. Indeed, on this reading, the three-part Lemon test reduces to a
single, overriding prohibition: the government may not take action that
fails to respect the religious or irreligious beliefs of individual citizens.
If the government takes action that violates Lemon by inhibiting
religion, its failure to respect the beliefs of the disadvantaged individuals
is evident. 233 When the government acts to advance religion, on the
other hand, the disadvantaging effect of its action is more subtle, but may
230 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. For a discussion of Everson and the Lemon test, see supra notes
37-67 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 205-29 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
233 For arguments contending that government inhibitions on religion should be considered
under the free exercise clause, as opposed to the establishment clause, see Laycock, Towards a Gen-
eral Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1378-88 (1981), and Riggs, Judicial Doublethink and the Es-
tablishment Clause: The Fallacy of Establishment by Inhibition, 18 VAL. U.L. REv. 285 (1984).
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be no less offensive. In advancing the religion of some of its citizens, the
government is acting to endorse that religion. In a religiously pluralistic
society, however, when the government endorses the religion of some, it
necessarily disapproves the religion or irreligion of others. As a result,
the government fails to respect the religious or irreligious beliefs of indi-
viduals whenever it acts either to advance or to inhibit religion. To bor-
row from Justice O'Connor, Lemon can be read to implement a
prohibition on "government endorsement or disapproval of religion, ' 234
but endorsement is precluded precisely because it signals a disapproval of
those religious and irreligious beliefs not favored by the government's
action.235
More generally, this type of inquiry supports Justice O'Connor's fo-
cus on the messages that are sent by the government when it acts to
advance or inhibit religion.236 The critical "audience," at least at this
stage of the analysis, is the group of individuals whose beliefs are disfa-
vored by the government action. Because we are attempting to protect
these individuals from an injury that is essentially psychological, we are
concerned with their perceptions of the government's action and
whether, from their point of view, the government has acted to assault
their religious or irreligious beliefs.237
The government cannot be expected to read the minds of its citizens
234 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). At least as I use the
term, "endorsement" implies government sponsorship or approval of religious beliefs as religious
beliefs, that is, sponsorship or approval of religious beliefs for their intrinsic truth and validity. See
generally Smith, Symbolisn Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the
"No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276-78 (1987) (describing several possible meanings
of "endorsement").
235 The Supreme Court's doctrine leaves room for certain government accommodations of reli-
gion; such accommodations, if properly confined, send messages neither of endorsement nor disap-
proval. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
See generally McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1; McConnell, Neutrality
Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146 (1986). The Court's doctrine also leaves room
for religious involvement in politics. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 202, at §§ 14-9 & 14-14
(arguing that religious involvement in politics is permissible and important, and that the purpose
prong of Lemon should not be read to forbid it).
236 See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICs, LAW, AND GOVERN-
MENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 214 (1983) (describing the establishment clause as "the only sub-
stantive constitutional restraint on what governments may say"); Beschle, The Conservative as
Liberal The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 151 (1987) (arguing that O'Connor's suggested approach supports a principle of
"liberal neutrality" under the religion clauses); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64
N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1986) (supporting O'Connor's endorsement-disapproval standard and discussing
its application in a number of specific settings); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It"--The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. Rav. 495 (1986) (discussing a "symbolic" under-
standing of the establishment clause focused on eliminating the perception of improper government
action).
237 See Dorsen & Sims, supra note 7, at 857-61.
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and avoid psychological assaults that it could not reasonably foresee.
But a psychological assault is reasonably foreseeable whenever the gov-
ermnent acts to endorse or disapprove religion, because such action al-
most invariably affronts the religious or irreligious beliefs of certain
individuals in society. As a result, the government should be precluded
from acting purposefully to endorse or disapprove religion; the first
prong of Lemon essentially embodies such a rule. Whatever the govern-
ment's actual purpose, moreover, action that has the principal or pri-
mary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion is likely to be perceived by
the disfavored individuals as an act of endorsement or disapproval.
Thus, the second prong of Lemon states that such action is also unconsti-
tutional. Likewise, the third prong of Lemon guards against the harms
that may be caused even by unintentional religious favoritism or disap-
proval, for when the government entangles itself with religion, it almost
inevitably conveys a message that (depending on the nature of the entan-
glement) it either endorses or disapproves of the religion with which it is
entangled.238
238 In proposing her "clarification" of Lemon, Justice O'Connor actually has advocated a signifi-
cant modification of the first and especially the second prongs of the test:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual pur-
pose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An
affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice invalid.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor treats the entan-
glement prong of Lemon as a separate matter. See id. at 689. Cf Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,
429-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning whether entanglement should be retained as
independent prong of test).
Unlike Justice O'Connor, I do not advocate any revision of the Lemon formula. Indeed, Justice
O'onnor's proposed revision of Lemon, as expounded in recent opinions, might create analytical
problems that the traditional standard avoids. See Smith, supra note 234, at 276-301. What I mean
to suggest is that the Lemon test, in its conventional formulation, works to prohibit various types of
government action that can be seen to endorse or disapprove religious or irreligious beliefs, causing
injury in the manner that I describe in the text.
Whether as conventionally stated or as modified by O'Connor, the Lemon test does not pre-
cisely identify, without over- or under-inclusiveness, those government practices that offend the reli-
gious or irreligious beliefs of individuals. The teaching of evolution in the public schools, for
example, deeply offends the religious beliefs of some, and yet this practice does not violate Lemon
because its purpose and primary effect are secular, and because it does not involve an impermissible
entanglement of government with religion. Conversely, some religious and irreligious individuals
might not be offended by practices that do violate Lemon in a manner that disfavors their beliefs. Cf
Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That
Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674, 732-34 (1987) (suggesting that virtually every
government practice offends some religious or irreligious beliefs, and noting that some religious be-
lievers may not resent being treated as "outsiders"). See generally R. MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSID-
ERS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICANS (1986) (discussing religious groups that have cultivated a
sense of separate identity in American culture and therefore a sense of "outsider" status); K. VON-
NEGUT, CAT'S CRADLE 122 (1963) (describing Bokonon's request that the government outlaw his
religion to give it "more zest, more tang"). But government practices within the prohibition of
Lemon are much more likely than other government practices to inflict injury in the manner of a
psychological assault, and they are much less likely to be supported by important secular interests.
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Government assaults on religious or irreligious beliefs vary in inten-
sity, and therefore in the degree of damage they are likely to inflict. 23 9
For purposes of evaluation, we can divide government action into three
basic groups.
First, and most offensive, is government action that is directly coer-
cive in inducing individuals to abandon their religious or irreligious be-
liefs and to subscribe to conflicting beliefs of the government's own
choosing. 240 Government sponsorship of religious exercises in the public
schools can be seen to involve this direct coercion, given the "captivity"
and impressionability of the targeted audience and the prominent effect
of peer pressure for this age group.241
Second, even when government action does not directly coerce indi-
viduals to abandon their own beliefs, it may force them to provide sub-
stantial financial support, through taxation, for beliefs that they reject.
Such support may assert indirect coercive pressure to conform to the
favored beliefs.242 In any event, the government is forcing individuals to
assist in the advancement of religious beliefs243 that they reject. This is
the primary vice of government support for private religious schools.
Finally, the government may engage in symbolic behavior that en-
dorses religious beliefs244 but that carries only a slight risk of indirect
And to the extent that Lemon does not prohibit government practices that nonetheless inflict psy-
chological injury, such as the teaching of evolution, the offended individuals might be able to claim
free exercise protection in the form of judicially-sanctioned exemptions from the practices in ques-
tion. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's free exercise doctrine, see 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK,
& J. YOUNG, supra note 226, at §§ 21.6-21.9 (1986). See generally infra note 318.
239 Cf McCoy & Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 39
VAND. L. REv. 249 (1986) (arguing that laws challenged under the religion clauses pose varying
risks of religious oppression and should be evaluated accordingly).
240 The free exercise clause has been found to provide some relief from government coercion with
respect to religious or irreligious beliefs. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG,
supra note 226, at §§ 21.6-21.9. As construed by the Supreme Court, "The Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compul-
sion" and can be violated "whether [the challenged] laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). For an argument that the original
understanding of the establishment clause supports a renewed focus on coercion, see McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
241 Cf Wallace v. Jaffiree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
("This Court's decisions have recognized a distinction when government sponsored religious exer-
cises are directed at impressionable children who are required to attend school, for then government
endorsement is much more likely to result in coerced religious beliefs.").
242 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.").
243 This point would also apply to the advancement of irreligious beliefs, but in our present soci-
ety, it is almost inconceivable that the government would provide financial support for irreligion as
such.
244 This point would also apply to the endorsement of irreligious beliefs, but such an endorsement
is almost inconceivable in our present society.
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coercion and that involves only an insignificant expenditure of public
monies. This type of action does show a lack of respect for the religious
and irreligious beliefs of disfavored individuals, but it is less disrespectful,
and therefore less damaging, than either of the first two types of govern-
ment action. Examples of this type of symbolic behavior include "offi-
cial" references to God or religion, such as those contained in our
national motto245 and in Presidential proclamations commending various
religions and religious exercises. 246
Each of these three types of government action can inflict psycho-
logical injury on those individuals whose beliefs are disfavored. More-
over, when the government acts in this fashion, it may encourage private
actors to be equally disrespectful of the religious and irreligious beliefs of
their fellow citizens, thereby compounding the damage. Standing alone,
these considerations would support a vigorous and unwavering adher-
ence to Lemon, one that would require the invalidation of government
practices falling in each of the three groupings. To the extent that other
considerations become relevant, however, it is important to note the va-
rying intensity of these government assaults on religious and irreligious
beliefs, for they inflict varying degrees of injury. The more damage that a
government action may cause, the greater the need for Supreme Court
vigilance in preventing that action.
2. Maintaining a Religiously Inclusive Political Community.-Our
society has an important interest in maintaining a religiously inclusive
political community. Whenever the government takes action that fails to
respect the religious or irreligious beliefs of individuals, it disserves this
interest; the act of disrespect has an exclusionary impact on the disfa-
vored individuals, thereby weakening their attachment to the political
community. 247 As a result, the government's interest in maintaining a
religiously inclusive political community provides independent support
for a prohibition on government action that fails to respect the religious
or irreligious beliefs of individual citizens. It therefore provides in-
dependent support for the Lemon test, understood as a prohibition on
messages of religious endorsement or disapproval. Just as the three
prongs of Lemon serve to protect individuals from psychological assaults
on their religious or irreligious beliefs, the three prongs also serve to pro-
tect the corresponding interest of the political community.
245 "In God We Trust." See 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1985).
246 See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1984).
Symbolic actions by government sometimes may cause more injury than substantial financial
undertakings. In particular, a symbolic action that is especially prominent, such as government
sponsorship of a religious symbol in a Christmas display, may cause more injury than a substantial
financial undertaking that does not garner the same level of public attention, simply because in the
latter case the disfavored religious or irreligious individuals may be unaware of the government's
action. My rank ordering assumes full citizen knowledge of government actions.
247 See supra notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
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Like the individual interest in avoiding psychological assaults, the
societal interest in maintaining a religiously inclusive political commu-
nity is injured more by certain types of government action than it is by
others. Indeed, because the relationship of individual citizens to the
political community is reciprocal, the damage to the community from
religious or irreligious exclusions varies in direct proportion to the extent
of the individual injury the government's action inflicts. Thus, directly
coercive government action causes the greatest injury to the political
community; significant financial support for religion causes a substantial,
but lesser, degree of harm; and symbolic government action, while it
causes some injury, is the least damaging. 248
Justice O'Connor has argued that the establishment clause "prohib-
its government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way
to a person's standing in the political community." 249 In so doing, she
has recognized that the Supreme Court's separationist doctrine places
limits on government action that affects the relationship between individ-
uals and the political community.25° As she has noted, government en-
dorsement of religion "sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompa-
nying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." 25'
Protecting the status of individuals in the political community in the
sense suggested by Justice O'Connor cannot be defended under a pro-
cess-based theory of nonoriginalist judicial review.252 But in protecting
individuals, we protect the political community itself, and this interest
does support the Court's doctrine under a theory of political-moral
reasoning.
Justice O'Connor correctly observes that religious and irreligious
messages send signals both to the religious "outsiders" and to the reli-
gious "insiders." The signal to the outsiders is exclusionary, and there-
fore damaging to the political community. The signal to the insiders, on
the other hand, is a message of embracement, one that strengthens the
insiders' ties to the community and, to that extent, strengthens the com-
munity itself. As noted earlier, the potential damage from exclusion gen-
erally exceeds the potential gain in loyalty that may come from the
embracing effect of the government's messages.253 Accordingly, the safer
248 See generally supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
249 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250 Professor Suzanna Sherry has suggested that O'Connor's reasoning may reflect a feminine
perspective that emphasizes notions of community over notions of individual rights. See Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 593-95
(1986).
251 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
252 See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
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course is to avoid the excluding effects of religious or irreligious
messages, even at the cost of foregoing their embracing benefits as well.
This suggests that a vigorous application of the Lemon test generally will
support the society's interest in maintaining a strong political commu-
nity. We need not be satisfied, however, with reliance on a general pre-
sumption that the damaging effects of exclusion will outweigh the
positive effects of embracement. Instead, we can look to the particular
government messages in question, and, with an eye to the groups receiv-
ing the signals of "insider" and "outsider" status, attempt to evaluate the
potential gains and losses to the community in each individual case.
As Professor Kenneth L. Karst has noted, an identification with the
American political community "comes easily, even automatically," for
most American citizens.254 By contrast, "identification with America is
a choice that entails costs" for members of cultural minorities, including
religious minorities.2 55 This suggests that in the issuance of religious or
irreligious messages, the political community should not be overly con-
cerned with the effect of these messages on those who are part of
America's religious mainstream. The community ties of these citizens
tend to be strong already, as well as resilient. Attention should be fo-
cused instead on those who stand closer to the edge of society, those who
hold unconventional views that may make them reluctant to attach
themselves to the American political community. The community bond
of these individuals is more likely to be weak and malleable. Thus,
messages of embracement may significantly strengthen their community
bond; messages of exclusion may destroy it altogether.
This analysis suggests that we should look primarily to the effect
that any given religious or irreligious message is likely to have on individ-
uals who hold minority religious or irreligious views, and only secondar-
ily to the effect of the message on those who are members of mainstream
religions. Certain types of messages, those that embrace religious or irre-
ligious minorities, might provide benefits to the political community that
outweigh the damaging effects of their exclusionary force. The positive
effect of the embracement might be strong, whereas the damaging effect
of exclusion might be modest, given that the excluded individuals-relig-
iously mainstream-probably would be little affected in their virtually
''automatic" loyalty to the American political community.
Realistically, of course, this type of message will hardly ever be sent
by a political community that acts through a process of majoritarian
decisionmaking. Instead, the typical religious or irreligious message sent
by government action in the United States is precisely the opposite: the
government sends a message of embracement to those whose religion is
mainstream, and a corresponding message of exclusion to those who hold




minority religious or irreligious beliefs. In so doing, however, the gov-
ernment engages in an act of embracement that will provide only margi-
nal benefits to the community and an act of exclusion that may damage
the community severely. In these circumstances-circumstances that
will be present in almost all cases-the government message, on balance,
has a damaging effect on the political community. Under this analysis,
then, as under the general presumption discussed earlier, the Supreme
Court in most cases will further the best interests of the American polit-
ical community through a vigorous enforcement of the Lemon test.
When the Supreme Court invalidates government action through its
enforcement of the Lemon test, of course, the Court itself sends messages
to those who had been favored and to those who had been disadvantaged
by the government action. It tells those who had been disadvantaged
that they are no longer to be treated as outsiders, and it thereby tends to
strengthen their ties to the political community. But it also tells those
who had been favored that they are no longer to be treated as insiders;
this tends to weaken the community bond of the previously favored
group.
For the reasons just discussed, however, the effect of the Court's
message on the political community will depend largely on its impact on
religious and irreligious minorities. In the typical establishment clause
case, this impact will be positive, for the Court will be signaling a re-
moval of outsider status for these groups. The impact on mainstream
religious believers, who are being denied their insider status, will be nega-
tive, but the damaging effect is likely to be modest.256 As previously
noted, these citizens tend to have a strong and resilient attachment to the
American political community. Moreover, when the Court acts to de-
prive these individuals of their insider status, their dissatisfaction may be
tempered by a realization that the Court is "adhering to a fixed rule of
neutrality rather than rejecting a particular expression of religious be-
lief."257 Here again, this analysis supports a forceful application of the
separationist doctrine represented by Everson and the Lemon test.
3. Protecting the Role of Religion in American Society.-Religion
has intrinsic, instrumental, and symbolic importance in American soci-
ety, and therefore should be maintained and protected.258 It could be
argued that although the Supreme Court's separationist doctrine protects
individual beliefs and safeguards the political community,259 it frustrates
256 This is not to deny that the Court's decision may generate considerable political controversy.
See Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REv.
817, 830-31 (1984). But the damaging effect of this controversy on the political community is likely
to be modest.
257 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 806 n.17 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
258 See supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 232-57 and accompanying text.
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our interest in supporting the role of religion in American society. On
close examination, however, such an argument is flawed. The Court's
doctrine does not hinder the role of religion in American society. To the
contrary, our judicially enforced separation of religion and government
may well invigorate religion and work to its long-term benefit.
When government action violates the Lemon test by inhibiting reli-
gion, the Court's doctrine obviously works to protect religion from disad-
vantage. Far more commonly, however, the government violates Lemon
by taking action that is designed to advance religion. Given the nature of
majoritarian decisionmaking, moreover, the benefited religion or reli-
gions are likely to be mainstream-religions with many actual and poten-
tial followers in the society. The government's action may hinder the
minority religions of those not favored by the government's action, but
because their numbers in the society are small, the disadvantage faced by
these religions would seem more than offset by the advantage conferred
upon the much more widely supported mainstream religions. On bal-
ance, then, majoritarian action designed to advance religion would ap-
pear to serve a positive function in fostering the cause of religion in
American society. Conversely, the Court's separationist doctrine, by
precluding majoritarian action of this type, would seem to frustrate, not
protect, the role of religion in the United States.
Although superficially appealing, this argument is unpersuasive.
The "religion" that is worth protecting in our society is what I will call
genuine religion. To have intrinsic value, a religion must be theologically
sound. To have instrumental and symbolic value, the religion need not
be theologically sound, but it must be perceived by its adherents as theo-
logically sound. Religion cannot play an instrumental or symbolic role
unless it influences the beliefs and conduct of its adherents, and this influ-
ence is largely a consequence of the believers' faith in the religion for its
own sake, for its intrinsic, religious worth. Thus, religion is valuable in
the United States only to the extent that it is genuine-that is, intrinsic-
ally sound, at least in the eyes of the religious believers.
For three related reasons, majoritarian action designed to benefit
religion tends to be unhelpful, if not counterproductive, to the cause of
genuine religion. First, the majoritarian system operates primarily on the
basis of secular arguments and political bargaining. Neither of these
processes is well-suited for the consideration of supra-rational matters of
religion. As a result, there is little reason to believe that the majoritarian
system will be able to identify religion or religions that are intrinsically
sound. 260
260 In the colonial period, Roger William was noted for doubting the competence of civil author-
ities to make decisions involving religious matters. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 n.20
(1962). For an argument that the views of Williams have been given too little attention by the
Supreme Court in its establishment clause jurisprudence, see M. HowE, supra note 101.
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Second, given the religious pluralism that exists even among main-
stream religions in our society, majoritarian action designed to support
religion often proceeds at an extremely general level of abstraction, one
that attempts to embrace all major elements of Christianity, and fre-
quently Judaism as well. State-sponsored prayers in the public schools,
for instance, generally have been framed in broadly "nondenomina-
tional" terms.261 By taking what amounts to a "lowest common denomi-
nator" approach to religion, however, the government supports a
"religion" that is likely to be mild and bland, if not entirely meaning-
less. 262 Such an approach does not support, and may even defeat, the
policy of supporting genuine and vibrant religion in the United States.
Third, and most important, government "support" for religion is
illusory because it tends to degrade and cheapen religion. To the extent
that government action actually coerces individual adherence to "reli-
gious" beliefs, those beliefs may not have religious worth at all. 263 More
generally, religion is simply too important to be reduced to the level of
nonreligious political decisionmaking. Political log-rolling and "lowest
common denominator" approaches may be acceptable for secular poli-
cymaking; they are unacceptable for religious matters. Religion has
value because it is special and -sacred.264 Although government "sup-
port" may provide short-term benefits, it undermines religion's special
and sacred character,265 and it thereby undermines the long-term vitality
261 The state-sponsored prayer at issue in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), for example, read
as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
262 Cf. G. GOLDBERG, RFCONSECRATNG AMERICA 62 (1984) (noting a description of the Engel
school prayer as "such a pathetically vacuous assertion of piety as hardly to rise to the dignity of a
religious exercise").
263 Many religions value the religious commitments of individuals on the premise that the indi-
viduals might choose not to make them. The presence of coercion undercuts that premise. As Pro-
fessor Carl H. Esbeck has observed:
[B]eginning with the Reformation there has slowly evolved a definition of religion which pre-
supposes voluntary adherence, not coercion, with a zone of personal spiritual autonomy with-
drawn from the reach of any civil authority. In Christian theology, mankind is given free will
concerning the claims of God on individual lives, including the possibility of choosing unbelief
and disobedience.
Esbeck, Religion and a Neutral State Imperative or Impossibility?, 15 CUMB. L. REv. 67, 81 (1984).
John Locke's argument for religious toleration rested heavily on this type of theological premise. See
Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649,
701-03 (1987). Cf R. MCBRIEN, CAESAR'S COIN: RELIGION AND POLrrIcs IN AMERICA 60 (1987)
("Coerced religion is an obstacle, not an aid, to genuine faith."). But cf. Garvey, supra note 209, at
791-92 (noting that religious believers may discount the role of individual choice and instead attri-
bute their religious faith to God Himself).
264 "[R]eligion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a
civil magistrate." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (quoting J. MADISON, supra note 219,
reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (appendix to dissenting opinion of
Justice Rutledge)).
265 As the Supreme Court noted in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), "a union of government
and religion tends ... to degrade religion," leading people to "[lose] their respect for any religion
1181
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of religion itself.266
At best, attempts by government to support religion are not helpful
to the cause of genuine religion; at worst, they are counterproductive.
Our societal interest in protecting the role of religion in the United States
therefore is not well served, and may be disserved, by government "sup-
port." Conversely, a vigorous enforcement of the Supreme Court's sepa-
rationist doctrine does not disserve the cause of religion in America267
and may help support it.268
The Supreme Court's separationist doctrine is supported by the need
to give religious and irreligious beliefs special protection, and also by the
corresponding societal interest in maintaining a religiously inclusive
political community. Our interest in protecting the role of religion, on
close examination, does not undercut the validity of the Court's doctrine,
and may actually provide it with further support. An analysis of these
three considerations, then, suggests that the Supreme Court's separation-
ist doctrine is sound as a matter of political-moral theory.269
that ha[s] relied upon the support of government to spread its faith." Id. at 431 (citing J. MADISON,
supra note 219, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (appendix to dissenting
opinion of Justice Rutledge)).
266 Cf. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that the establishment clause works to prevent "the secularization of a creed
which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government"); A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 215, at 274 ("[W]hen a religion chooses to rely on the interests of this
world, it becomes almost as fragile as all earthly powers. Alone, it may hope for immortality; linked
to ephemeral powers, it follows their fortunes and often falls together with the passions of a day
sustaining them."); M. HOWE, supra note 101, at 11 ("The ultimate strength of our religious estab-
lishment is derived... not from the favoring acts of government, but, in largest measure, from the
continuing force of the evangelical principle of separation."); id at 149 ("[Ihe thesis of Roger
Williams [was] that government must have nothing to do with religion lest in its clumsy desire to
favor the churches or its savage effort to injure religion it bring the corruptions of the wilderness into
the holiness of the garden.").
For an argument that government in the United States has increasingly attempted to secularize
and co-opt religion for its own purposes, see Van Astyne, supra note 109. See also Van Alstyne,
What is "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C.L. REV. 909, 913-16 (1987).
267 There is little evidence that religion has been suffering under the generally separationist doc-
trine that the Supreme Court has enforced in the post-Everson era. To the contrary, recent years
have witnessed "a rising tide of interest in religion." Gallup, supra note 225, at 173. See generally
supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
268 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 821-22 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf J. MUR-
RAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 73-74 (1960) (arguing that American religion has profited from
"the maintenance, even in exaggerated form, of the distinction between church and state"); Martin,
Revived Dogma and New Cult, 111 DAEDALUS 53, 54-55 (1982) (contrasting the vitality of religion
in North America with the "icy thinness" of religion in European countries maintaining state
churches). But cf. Bradley, Dogmatomachy--A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases,
30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 275, 280 (1986) (arguing that through the Supreme Court's religion clause
cases, "virtually the full measure of judicial power is deployed to accomplish" the "demise of reli-
gious consciousness").
269 My discussion has proceeded on the premise that religion should be maintained and protected
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C. A Political-Moral Defense of the Supreme Court's Subtheme
Although the Supreme Court generally has required a careful sepa-
ration of religion and government, it has permitted government to favor
religion in selected cases, creating an important subtheme in its doc-
trine.270 In these cases, the Court frequently has relied on the presence of
traditional societal support for the particular government practices in
question.2 71 As set forth earlier, the Supreme Court's decisions uphold-
ing traditional government practices that favor religion cannot be de-
fended under a common values approach to nonoriginalist judicial
review.272 At least some of these decisions, however, can be defended
under a theory of political-moral reasoning. In particular, the Court
properly may uphold certain government practices that violate Everson
and the Lemon test if those practices have a long history of wide support
in the United States.
In evaluating the Court's dominant, separationist doctrine, we
looked to the messages sent by government actions and by the Supreme
Court in its rulings concerning their constitutionality.273 The same type
of analysis is appropriate here. Traditional government practices that
favor religion, like nontraditional practices, send messages of disapproval
to those not favored by the government's action and thereby cause dam-
age both to the disadvantaged individuals and to the political community
itself. This individual and community damage varies with the nature of
the government action; direct coercion is the most damaging, significant
financial support for religion is somewhat less so, and symbolic action,
although still injurious, is the least troublesome.2 74
The degree of damage also varies, however, with the historical status
of the government program in question. Other things being equal, long-
standing government practices are less disrespectful to the disfavored in-
dividuals than are newly conceived government programs. As stable fea-
tures of the political landscape, traditional practices are more likely to be
accepted by the disfavored individuals as part of a preexisting status
quo-something that they may not like, but that they accept essentially
as a given, a fact of life. Moreover, because they are in large part prod-
ucts of the past, they send a less offensive message in the present; the
because of its intrinsic, instrumental, and symbolic importance in American society. Even if this
premise were rejected, however, that would not affect my other arguments in defense of the Supreme
Court's separationist doctrine, that is, my arguments concerning the protection of religious and irre-
ligious beliefs and concerning the maintenance of a religiously inclusive political community. See
generally supra notes 232-57 and accompanying text. And those arguments, without more, might
well be adequate to support the Court's separationist doctrine.
270 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
272 See id.
273 See supra notes 233-38 & 249-57 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 239-46 & 248 and accompanying text.
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modem political community has not made new policies that signal a con-
temporary statement of disrespect, but rather has simply continued to
maintain the long-standing policies of the past. As a result, the disfa-
vored individuals will suffer a lesser degree of injury, and the correspond-
ing damage to the political community will be similarly reduced.
Like other government attempts to favor religion, traditional "sup-
port" is in large part illusory. No less than newly conceived efforts,
traditional actions purportedly in furtherance of religion do little to ad-
vance the cause of genuine religion, and may well be counterproduc-
tive.275 Because the actions are traditional, however, their continuation
may have some symbolic value for the political community. The mainte-
nance of traditional practices concerning religion may support a sense of
present-day religious similarity as well as a sense of common heritage,
and these factors may strengthen the community bond of many citi-
zens.276 These citizens, however, are likely to be mainstream religious
believers and already solid members of the American political commu-
nity; the gain to the community is therefore likely to be modest.277
The continuation of traditional government practices favoring reli-
gion causes damage to individuals and to the political community, and
the offsetting symbolic gain to the community is not substantial. On the
other hand, these practices clearly are less harmful than similar practices
lacking a traditional stature in the society. As a result, there is less rea-
son for the Supreme Court to invalidate them.
When the Supreme Court acts to invalidate government action
designed to favor religion, moreover, the Court itself sends messages. By
enforcing a rule of neutrality it shows respect for the religious and irrelig-
ious beliefs of individuals, and it does not harm-and may help ad-
vance-the role of genuine religion in American society. Further, in the
typical establishment clause case, the Court's decision strengthens the
American political community. Its action weakens the community
bonds of those who had been treated by the government as religious in-
siders, but this loss is more than offset by the strengthened bonds of the
religious and irreligious minorities who had been disfavored.278
The invalidation of traditional government action, however, may on
balance have a negative effect on the political community. Those favored
by the challenged government action-typically, mainstream religious
believers-may feel that history has given them a vested interest in the
insider status conferred by the government's traditional practice, and
they may regard the practice as an important symbol of American heri-
tage. As a result, the Supreme Court's invalidation may have a more
275 See supra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
278 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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damaging than usual exclusionary effect on them. At the same time, the
embracing effect of invalidation on the religious and irreligious minorities
disadvantaged by the government action may be only modest; if these
individuals suffer only minor offense from the traditional government
practice, the Court's removal of this offense likewise will have only a
minor, albeit positive, impact.
Other things equal, then, the Supreme Court does less good and
causes more harm when it invalidates traditional, as opposed to nontradi-
tional, government practices that are designed to favor religion. This
does not mean, however, that all such traditional practices should be up-
held. Rather, the Court must weigh in each case the costs and benefits of
invalidation. Some traditions are more long-standing and widely sup-
ported than others; the stronger the tradition, the greater its impact in
counseling against invalidation.279 On the other hand, the Court must
also consider the intensity with which the challenged government action
assaults the religious or irreligious beliefs of the individuals that it disfa-
vors, for this determines the extent of individual and community damage
the government's action is causing.
Direct coercion, even if traditional, is extremely offensive to individ-
ual beliefs and therefore extremely damaging to the political community
as well; the benefits of judicial invalidation in this context surely will
outweigh the costs. As a result, the Supreme Court properly has invali-
dated state-sponsored prayer in the public schools, 2 0 however traditional
this practice might have been.2 1 Conversely, symbolic government ac-
tion, involving neither direct coercion nor a significant expenditure of
public monies, should be upheld if the action is traditional, for in these
circumstances the costs of judicial invalidation probably would exceed
the benefits. 282 Under this reasoning, for example, the long-sanctioned
"official" references to God and religion in our national motto and in
Presidential proclamations should not be declared unconstitutional.283
This reasoning also may support the constitutionality of legislative
279 Cf Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The more
longstanding and widely accepted a practice, the greater its impact on constitutional
interpretation.").
280 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
281 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. This rationale for the unconstitutionality of state-
sponsored prayer in the public schools is sound regardless of the Court's own reasoning, which
claims that such prayer is unconstitutional even though coercion may not be present. See, e.g.,
Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31. See generally supra note 241 and accompanying text.
282 Cf Crabb, Religious Symbols, American Traditions and the Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv.
509 (arguing that the Constitution should be read to permit the government to use religious symbols
that commemorate religious traditions with an enduring history of official sanction).
283 The reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance ("one nation under God," see 36 U.S.C.
§ 172 (1985)) is considerably more problematic. In many settings, such as the public schools, the
pledge is likely to be used in a manner that is directly coercive. Even in the absence of direct
coercion, moreover, this practice, dating back only to 1954, may not be sufficiently long-standing to
qualify as "traditional" under the analysis I have suggested. See generally Loewy, supra note 236, at
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prayer,284 Sunday closing laws,285 and government sponsorship of reli-
gious symbols in Christmas displays, 286 although these results are more
controversial.287
The most difficult cases involve traditional financial support for reli-
gion. This form of government action is less offensive to the disfavored
individuals than direct coercion, but more offensive than symbolic action.
In this area, the appropriate result may depend on the nature and extent
of the financial support and the nature and extent of the government
tradition. Tax exemptions for religious organizations, for example, in-
volve only indirect financial assistance and are supported by a tradition
that predates our national founding and that extends to all corners of
American government. As a result, this reasoning may support the con-
stitutionality of such exemptions. 288
Under a political-moral analysis, government action designed to
favor religion is less troublesome when it is supported by tradition, and
the judicial invalidation of such action carries significant costs of its own.
As a result, the Supreme Court's subtheme, recognizing exceptions to the
1058-60 (arguing that the reference to God in the pledge should be considered unconstitutional
under Justice O'Connor's endorsement-disapproval standard).
284 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
285 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
286 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
287 One might argue that legislative prayer and Sunday closing laws involve more than symbolic
government action. Legislative prayer might be viewed as directly coercive, although the audience is
hardly as impressionable as the children targeted by public school prayer. Compare Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) with id. at 798 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the case of Sunday
closing laws, one might point to the competitive financial advantage that they provide to members of
the favored religions, and thereby argue that these laws, in fact if not in form, provide substantial
financial support to these religions. See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (consid-
ering, but rejecting, a free exercise claim based on a similar argument).
Government sponsorship of religious symbols in Christmas displays, on the other hand, gener-
ally is not directly coercive and typically involves only a modest financial expense. Cf Choper,
Church, State and the Supreme Court: Current Controversy, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 551, 553 (1987) (ap-
proving the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, because "[n]o one was forced to do
anything," and because the expenditure of tax funds was "de minimus"). But such sponsorship may
not be supported by a sufficiently long-standing and widespread tradition to be upheld under the
analysis I have suggested. Cf Lynch, 465 U.S. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is simply impos-
sible to tell.., whether the practice [of displaying nativity scenes] ever gained widespread accept-
ance, much less official endorsement, until the 20th century.").
288 In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld property tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations. The Court noted that in granting such exemptions, "the govern-
ment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state." Id. at 675. The Court also cited the American historical tradition of
granting tax exemptions to religious organizations, a tradition that began in pre-Revolutionary times
and that had continued since then as "an unbroken practice" at both the state and federal levels of
government. Id. at 676-78.
Based on similar reasoning, Sunday closing laws might properly be upheld as constitutional
even if they are seen to provide indirect financial support for the members of favored religions. See
generally supra note 287.
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usual doctrine of Everson and Lemon, is at least partially defensible. In
particular, the Court properly may uphold traditional symbolic support
for religion, and it may permit certain types of traditional financial sup-
port as well. 289
D. Political-Moral Reasoning, Judicial Activism, and the
Establishment Clause: Why the Supreme Court?
I have argued that the broad features of the Supreme Court's estab-
lishment clause doctrine-including its dominant, separationist compo-
nent and at least some of its contradictory subtheme-are supported by
principles and policies determined through a process of political-moral
reasoning. This type of nonoriginalist constitutional decisionmaking,
however, deeply undercuts the principle of majoritarian government.
Quantitatively, this method of judicial review holds a theoretically limit-
less potential for judicial invalidation. Qualitatively, the Court's method
of decision is designed neither to enhance the procedural operation of the
majoritarian system nor to give effect to widespread societal values,
whether past, present, or even future. Both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, therefore, this type of judicial role is extremely activist.290 As a
result, the case for such a judicial role must be especially persuasive if it
is to succeed. For several reasons, however, the case for an activist judi-
cial role in this area is especially persuasive.
First, the Court's decisionmaking creates national constitutional
law, providing answers applicable nationwide regarding the proper rela-
tionship of religion and government. When the issues at stake are as
important and controversial as those concerning church-state relations, it
simply will not do to have a piecemeal resolution of these matters at the
state and local levels. The twentieth century has witnessed dramatic
changes in communication practices and personal mobility in the United
States. As a result, we have become an increasingly national political
community, and it has become increasingly important to support the
289 The Supreme Court sends messages not only when it invalidates government actions, but also
when it upholds them. Although the messages sent by constitutional approval generally are less
potent than the messages sent by constitutional invalidation, the Court should not ignore the poten-
tially damaging effects of constitutional decisions that validate government actions. In upholding a
traditional government action under its subtheme, for example, the Supreme Court may not only
sanction the challenged government practice, but also give it dramatic national exposure. In so
doing, the Court may broadly extend the reach of the practice's damaging impact on the religious or
irreligious individuals that the practice disfavors, and thereby also increase the resultant damage to
the political community. For the reasons discussed in the text, a judicial decision upholding a tradi-
tional practice, on balance, often is preferable to a decision finding such a practice unconstitutional.
In some situations, however, the Supreme Court might be well advised to avoid a decision altogether
by simply denying review. Cf Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DuKE
L.J. 1, 56 (arguing that the Court should have denied certiorari in Lynch, the nativity scene case).
290 On the distinction between quantitative and qualitative measures of judicial activism, see
supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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political community at that level. To ensure that our citizens identify
themselves as "Americans first and Georgians or New Yorkers sec-
ond, ' 29 1 we must provide American answers to our most fundamental
issues of principle and policy. Independent of its intrinsic merit, there-
fore, the Court's establishment clause doctrine serves an important func-
tion by nationalizing our society's response to issues of church and
state.
292
Second, and far more important, the Court's judicial activism leads
to national answers that are, in general, intrinsically meritorious. I have
just demonstrated that the thrust of the Court's establishment clause
doctrine is politically and morally sound. The Court's activism therefore
serves a vital function by strengthening our society both politically and
morally.
Third, these nationalizing and strengthening functions can be per-
formed effectively only by the Supreme Court. Although Congress con-
ceivably could set national policies governing church-state relations,
neither Congress nor any other majoritarian body is likely to formulate
policies that are politically and morally sound. As the Court's establish-
ment clause cases themselves attest, majoritarian officials are prone to
adopt policies that give insufficient respect to individual religious and ir-
religious beliefs, that damage the political community, and that may ac-
tually hinder the role of religion in American society. 293 Absent the
Supreme Court's activist doctrine, we likely would be governed by a
patchwork quilt of majoritarian policies concerning church-state issues,
policies that would differ widely from state to state. More troubling still,
many of these policies would be seriously injurious both to individual
citizens and to society.
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court's doctrine is politically
and morally superior to the majoritarian policies that would otherwise
prevail, because the Court is institutionally more capable than
majoritarian officials in determining the proper relationship between reli-
gion and government. Majoritarian officials, given their temporary and
politically contingent tenure in office, tend to focus on the short-term
interests of politically important constituents, that is, those constituents
who have sufficient numbers and political strength to affect the officials'
continued tenure in office. 294 The interests of these constituents, more-
291 "Some minimum homogeneity of social institutions is necessary if people are to consider
themselves Americans first and Georgians or New Yorkers second." R. POSNER, supra note 29, at
193.
292 For a more elaborate discussion of the nationalizing function of nonoriginalist judicial review,
see Conlde, supra note 31, at 26-30.
293 See supra notes 230-69 and accompanying text.
294 This tendency should not be exaggerated. See generally Tushnet, Schneider, & Kovner, Judi-
cial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEx. L. REv. 967, 971-80 (1988) (discuss-
ing the electoral incentives of members of the House of Representatives).
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over, often are identified more by public opinion than by careful analysis
and reflection, for it is the voting public, however uninformed, that will
determine the officials' political fate. As a result, even ill-advised public
opinion may prevail over forceful arguments of principle and policy.
The short-term and reflexive tendencies of majoritarian decision-
making can be problematic in various areas,295 but they are especially
troublesome when the government policies affect the relationship be-
tween church and state. In this area, majoritarian officials will be
strongly inclined to adopt policies designed to support mainstream reli-
gions, despite the damaging effects of such policies. They are likely to
discount, of course, the injuries that their actions might inflict on minor-
ity religious and irreligious individuals, for these persons ordinarily will
not comprise any significant segment of the voting public. They also are
likely to ignore the risks of damage to the political community and to the
long-term cause of religion itself. These risks are primarily risks for the
future, not the present. Moreover, although these risks are real and seri-
ous, my arguments also disclose that the risks are subtle, not obvious;
they require a rather elaborate demonstration through a process of rea-
soned argument.
Average citizens, if not majoritarian officials themselves, simply lack
the time and inclination to devote themselves to the type of contempla-
tive discourse and reflection that is necessary for a proper evaluation of
church-state questions. Instead, public opinion and majoritarian policy
are likely to be informed by beliefs that are superficially appealing, but
ultimately unpersuasive. In particular, a politically powerful majority
may well believe that it is advisable for government to attempt to support
the mainstream religion or religions to which most citizens adhere.
Given the intensity of religious beliefs, moreover, this group may urge
government support for religion with an unusual passion and emotion.
As a result of all these factors, majoritarian officials are likely to adopt
policies designed to favor mainstream religions, policies that are neither
politically nor morally sound.
Justices of the Supreme Court, by contrast, hold a tenure that is
neither temporary nor politically contingent. They are more likely to
consider the future as well as the immediate effects of government poli-
cies, and they need not respond to a public opinion that may be unin-
formed. The "flesh and blood of... actual case[s]," moreover, provide
the Justices with "an extremely salutary proving ground for all abstrac-
tions," ensuring "a process that tests as it creates. ' 296 To a far greater
extent than majoritarian decisionmaking, the judicial process is a forum
295 Witness, for example, the chronic tendency of Congress and the President to engage in deficit
spending, which provides short-term benefits but may impose serious long-term costs.
296 A. BICKEL, supra note 75, at 26.
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for reason, argument, and careful deliberation.297 The judicial forum
therefore permits a reasoned, open, and deliberative consideration of all
of the relevant factors that ought to inform the relationship between
church and state, including both short- and long-term considerations re-
garding individual beliefs, the political community, and the role of reli-
gion in the United States.298  The Court does have institutional
weaknesses, of course. It cannot conduct elaborate empirical investiga-
tions, for example, nor can it draft comprehensive regulations in the
manner of a legislature or administrative body. But none of its institu-
tional weaknesses hinders the Court in formulating and applying its es-
tablishment clause doctrine. This type of comparative institutional
analysis firmly supports the Supreme Court's exercise of its decisionmak-
ing function under the establishment clause.299
I say that the Court is exercising a decisionmaking function "under
the establishment clause." Yet the arguments presented thus far in de-
fense of the Court's doctrine have been entirely nontextual. These argu-
ments would apply with lequal force even if the establishment clause had
never been adopted. Nonetheless, the Court could not properly engage
in its nonoriginalist decisionmaking in this area in the absence of plausi-
ble textual support.
The legitimacy of the Court's nonoriginalist decisionmaking de-
pends not only on its functional utility, but also on at least some measure
of popular consent or acquiescence. Such consent or acquiescence pro-
vides a partial bridge to the principle of majoritarian government, one
that helps mitigate the "deviance" of nonoriginalist judicial review in a
democratic society. 300 The public need not, and frequently will not, ap-
prove of the content of the Court's constitutional doctrine, but it must
remain generally satisfied with the nature of the Court's process of deci-
sion, its method of formulating constitutional law. Indeed, the Court
necessarily relies on the popular branches to respect and implement its
constitutional decisions. This occurs only because the popular branches
and the people that they serve are generally satisfied with the Court's role
in constitutional adjudication. 30 1
297 Cf Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REv. 4, 76-77 (1986) (emphasizing the importance of reasoned justification and dialogue
in judicial decisionmaking). See generally E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 89-95.
298 See generally Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice.: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1042-52 (1987) (presenting a com-
parative institutional analysis suggesting that, as compared to majoritarian officials, federal judges
are more likely to give proper weight to "particularist" as well as "universalist" values).
299 See generally Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 145.
300 See A. BICKEL, supra note 75, at 18.
301 Professor Leonard W. Levy's comments concerning judicial review in general apply equally to
nonoriginalist review in particular:
Judicial review would never have flourished had the people been opposed to it. They have
opposed only its exercise in particular cases, but not the power itself. They have the sovereign
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Neither the popular branches nor the people have ever, or would
ever, consent to or acquiesce in a limitless power of "constitutional" deci-
sionmaking by the judiciary. 30 2 Instead, their consent or acquiescence
extends only to an interpretive role for the Supreme Court, a role that
assumes the constitutional text to have at least some meaning.30 3 Popu-
lar views concerning the limits of this interpretive role no doubt are in-
complete and widely disparate. In light of the increasingly public debate
concerning originalist versus nonoriginalist methods of decision,304 for
example, there may be no consensus on whether the Court properly
makes constitutional doctrine going beyond the original understanding.
Nonetheless, majoritarian officials, and the public in general, plainly
would reject "constitutional" decisionmaking not even plausibly sup-
ported by language in the constitutional text.305
The Court's constitutional doctrine concerning the relationship be-
tween religion and government is plausibly supported by the language of
the establishment clause, when it is read in conjunction with the four-
teenth amendment. Some might find the language supportive in original-
ist terms, although such a conclusion would be erroneous. 30 6 Others
might find the language supportive on a view that the Constitution is a
living, growing document, capable of being read in a way not envisioned
or intended by its framers and ratifiers at all.30 7 In any event, the rela-
tionship of religion and government is addressed in the establishment
clause, and this provides a plausible link between the Court's doctrine
and the constitutional text.30 8 In the absence of this textual link, the
power to abolish it outright or hamstring it by constitutional amendment. The President and
Congress could bring the Court to heel even by ordinary legislation. The Court's membership,
size, funds, staff, rules of procedure, and enforcement agencies are subject to the control of the
"political" branches. Judicial review, in fact, exists by the tacit consent of the governed.
L. LEVY, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE SUPREME COURT 1, 12 (1967). Elsewhere I have argued that this popular consent or acquies-
cence is evidenced most clearly by Congress's consistent failure to exercise its power to restrict the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 638-58.
302 See Lusky, For Preservation of Judicial Review, 3 J.L. & POL. 597, 617-19 (1987).
303 I am using the term "interpretive" to suggest this textual link, and not to refer to originalist
constitutional decisionmaking. On the matter of terminology, see Conlde, supra note 6, at 594 n.25.
304 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
305 For articles discussing the importance of the constitutional text, see, for example, Powell,
Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1427 (1986), and
Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982).
306 See supra notes 77-143 and accompanying text.
307 For an especially powerful argument along these lines, see M. PERRY, supra note 73, at 121-79
(contending that in addition to its originalist meaning, the text of the Constitution has a nonoriginal-
ist, symbolic meaning that embodies fundamental aspirations of the American political tradition,
aspirations that in turn provide the operative basic standards for constitutional discourse).
308 As the Court's substantive due process cases attest, textual support for the Court's constitu-
tional doctrines need not be especially specific or persuasive. At least in today's political and legal
culture, however, some textual support is required even for doctrines that depend primarily on
nontextual justifications. For arguments suggesting that this textual link may not have been critical
for the founding generation, see, for example, Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U.
1191
82:1113 (1988)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Court's decisionmaking function almost surely would be rejected by the
people and their elected representatives. In this limited but critical sense,
then, the text of the Constitution does matter, and the Court in fact is
exercising a decisionmaking function "under the establishment clause."
Beyond the bare text of the establishment clause, moreover, the cir-
cumstances of history have permitted the Supreme Court to support its
doctrine with references to the opinions of important personalities from
America's founding generation. Thus, the Court has been able to rely on
the views of individual framers, including especially James Madison, and
of other heroic figures, such as Thomas Jefferson. 30 9 This in no way
makes the Court's decisionmaking originalist, for an analysis of the col-
lective intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the first and fourteenth
amendments clearly demonstrates that the original understanding of the
Constitution does not support the Court's doctrine.310 Nonetheless, by
relying-however selectively-on the views of prominent Founding Fa-
thers, the Court enhances its legitimacy in the eyes of the American peo-
ple and their political representatives by aligning itself with historical
giants, men who are broadly revered in modem American society.311
V. CONCLUSION
The search for a single, unifying theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion may be chimerical. Instead, different theories may be necessary for
different areas of constitutional doctrine.312 Originalism may be appro-
priate for the interpretation of certain constitutional provisions.313 Non-
CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987), and Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. RaV. 843 (1978).
309 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
310 See supra notes 77-143 and accompanying text.
311 As Professor Richard B. Saphire has noted, "[H]istorically-rooted principles may be espe-
cially valued by society to the extent they are perceived as representing the judgments of predeces-
sors whose actions and wisdom are widely regarded as heroic or deserving of honor." Saphire, supra
note 93, at 766.
312 Likewise, these different theories may have important interrelationships, which in turn may
vary from one context to the next. See generally Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. Rav. 1189 (1987) (discussing the interrelationship of various
types of constitutional argument); Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REv. 1331 (1988) (defending a method of decision that combines a variety of considerations, includ-
ing text, history, tradition, consensus, precedent, and social policy); Saphire, Enough About Original-
ism, 15 N. KY. L. REv. 513 (1988) (suggesting that every constitutional case evokes both originalist
and nonoriginalist conceptions of the Constitution, and that these competing conceptions in fact may
offer complementary insights). But cf M. TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 180-85 (criticizing attempts to
rely on different theories for different areas of constitutional doctrine).
313 Professor Stephen L. Carter has argued that an originalist approach may be advisable for
certain structural provisions of the Constitution. See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the
Indeterminate Text" A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 847-65
(1985). For a critique, of Carter's arguments and Carter's reply, see Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions
Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Professor Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U.L. Rev.
47 (1986), and Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U.L.
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originalist theories of various types may explain and justify other aspects
of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking. Process theory,
for example, may illuminate many of the Court's freedom of expression
and voting cases,314 and a forward-looking theory of common values may
explain numerous decisions in the areas of due process, equal protection,
and the eighth amendment. 315
None of these relatively nonactivist theories, however, adequately
explains the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine. This doc-
trine requires instead a nonoriginalist theory of political-moral reasoning,
a theory that permits the Court simply to identify and apply principles
and policies that are sound. Such a theory calls for an exceedingly ac-
tivist judicial role-a role that is deeply problematic in a society commit-
ted to the concept of majoritarian government. Nonetheless, in the
particular setting of church and state, this type of judicial activism is
both defensible and desirable. The relationship between religion and
government is a matter of central importance in our society; it has signifi-
cant effects on individuals, on the political community, and on religion
itself. The Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine, moreover, has
achieved a national resolution of church-state issues far superior to that
which would prevail in its absence. In large part, this is due to institu-
tional characteristics permitting the Court to make decisions that are po-
litically and morally superior to the decisions reached by the
majoritarian process.
The legitimacy of any type of constitutional decisionmaking by the
judiciary depends on the function it can perform and whether that func-
tion can be justified within a system of majoritarian government. In the
words of the late Professor Alexander M. Bickel:
The search must be for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the
making of policy, yet which differs from the legislative and executive func-
tions; which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will
not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do not assume it; which can
be so exercised as to be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge
Hand's satisfaction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be effective
when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality
of the other departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and
burden of their own responsibility. 316
A function that satisfies these criteria in certain areas of constitutional
law may fail utterly in other areas, resulting in the need for different
theoretical justifications.
In this Article, I have presented a theory designed to support the
Rev. 71 (1986). See also Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-
Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719.
314 See J. ELY, supra note 22, at 105-25.
315 See Conkle, supra note 6, at 625-64.
316 A. BICKEL, supra note 75, at 24.
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broad features of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking
under the establishment clause.317 Judicial activism of the sort defended
here may be indefensible in other areas of constitutional law. In this
particular setting, however, the Court's activism is not merely justified; it
is essential to the political and moral health of the society.318
317 Justice Scalia recently has asserted that the Supreme Court's establishment clause decision-
making in particular cases has been so erratic and unpredictable as to be "embarrassing." See Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2607 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's appraisal, moreover,
finds considerable support in the academic community. See, eg., L. LEVY, supra note 92, at 162-63
(describing the Supreme Court's establishment clause decisions as "inexcusably inconsistent" and
"erratic and unprincipled"); Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO
ST. L.J. 409, 450 (1986) (arguing that the Lemon test "has been so elastic in its application that it
means everything and nothing"); Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doc-
trine, 48 U. Prr. L. REv. 83, 114 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's establishment clause
decisions as radically indeterminate). See generally Levinson, Separation of Church and State: And
the Wall Came Tumbling Down, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 707 (1984); Redlich, Separation of Church and
State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094 (1985).
Although I have made no attempt to evaluate all of the Supreme Court's numerous decisions
under the establishment- clause, I suspect that these complaints may be somewhat exaggerated.
Many of the Court's "inconsistent" results may be reconcilable under the theoretical approach sug-
gested in this Article. On the other hand, significant inconsistencies may remain, especially in cases
involving aid to parochial schools. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In any event, the
remedy for inconsistent application of a constitutional doctrine-to the extent that such exists
here-is consistent application, not abandonment.
318 My theoretical defense of the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine may have impli-
cations for the free exercise clause as well. Although I have not attempted to address these implica-
tions here, I suspect that my analysis would support the basic features of the Supreme Court's free
exercise doctrine. In particular, I suspect that the judicial recognition of religion-based exemptions
from laws of general application, to the extent required by the Court's doctrine, might work to
protect individual beliefs, maintain the political community, and safeguard the role of religion in
American society. If so, then the Court's free exercise doctrine might be defensible on that basis,
and the doctrine might be seen to both supplement and complement the Court's decisionmaking
under the establishment clause. See generally supra notes 235 & 238.
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